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Canonical studies of trade liberalization focus on its effects on aggregate in-
come and on the distribution of income. The interaction between these two effects
of trade liberalization has been less studied. In this dissertation, I study this in-
teraction. More precisely, I study the relationship between international trade and
income inequality, with a focus on the implications for aggregate saving and the gains
from trade. I argue that accounting for the effects of international trade on income
inequality among entrepreneurs can imply higher gains from trade for workers.
In the second chapter, I construct a dynamic model of international trade
with incomplete markets. In the model, entrepreneurs face uninsurable idiosyncratic
productivity risk, and thus save. Since the most productive entrepreneurs have the
highest saving rate and are the ones that export, a reduction in trade costs increases
their share of total profits and their savings, which leads to a large increase in the ag-
gregate supply of capital and increased capital accumulation. I calibrate the model
using US data and examine the effects of international trade on aggregate output, the
consumption of workers, and the consumption of entrepreneurs with heterogeneous
productivity. In the model, international trade increases aggregate output by 2.5%
and the wage of workers by 3.4%. On the other hand, while the aggregate consump-
tion of entrepreneurs is unchanged by international trade, the increase in inequality
of profits among entrepreneurs implies that the certainty-equivalent consumption of
a typical entrepreneur actually decreases by 4.0%. Capital accumulation plays an
important role in the model, accounting for 51.9% of the output gains from trade.
To isolate the effects of the proposed mechanism, I construct a benchmark model
with complete markets, in which firms with heterogeneous productivity are owned
by a single entrepreneur. In this complete markets benchmark, the increase in ag-
gregate output due to international trade is 1.8% while the increase in the wage of
workers from trade is 2.7%. Therefore, the novel mechanism in my model increases
the wage gains for workers by 25.9%, and the gains in aggregate output by 38.9%,
compared to the complete markets benchmark.
In the third chapter, I test the key predictions of the model using country-
level data. Using fixed-effects (FE) regressions in a large panel of countries, I find a
significant and positive correlation between trade openness and the aggregate saving
rate. I find a much weaker relationship between trade openness and the investment
rate. Furthermore, I show that greater trade openness has a stronger effect on the
aggregate saving rate in a country where the initial top 10% share of total income
(before any changes in trade openness) is higher. This is in line with my model where
the increase in the aggregate saving is driven by top income earners. Additionally, I
build on the gravity-based instrumental-variable (IV) approach pioneered by Frankel
and Romer (1999) and extend it to a panel setting. I find a larger effect of trade
openness on the aggregate saving rate in the fixed-effects panel regressions with IV
than without IV. The results provide strong evidence that a supply-side channel of
increased capital accumulation is operative following an increase in trade openness.
In the fourth chapter, I study the relationship between the household saving
rate and openness in China through the lens of the framework outlined in the second
chapter. I show that there has been a large increase in top income shares both
among entrepreneurs and workers over the past 30 years in China. Additionally,
there is a very significant and positive correlation between top income shares and
the household saving rate across Chinese counties. Using the setting of the 1992
liberalization episode, I find that provinces with a greater increase in openness
experienced a larger increase in the household saving rate during the period. Taken
together, the evidence is supportive of the hypothesis that greater openness increases
the household saving rate in China, by increasing the share of total income received
by the highest-income households who also have the highest saving rate.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The global rise of inequality and the increased economic integration between
countries are two of the most important developments in the world economy over
the past 50 years. The share of total income received by the top 5% earners in
the US increased from 20.9% to 33.1% between 1961 and 2005, while the income
share of the top 0.1% increased from 2.1% to 7.8%.1 Over the same period, global
trade volume increased at an annual rate of 5.9% between 1950 and 2004 (Hummels,
2007). A notable example is China, where the sum of exports and imports as a share
of GDP increased from 5.3% in 1986 to 68.6% in 2005 (World Bank, 2012).
Canonical studies of trade liberalization focus on its effects on aggregate in-
come and on the distribution of income. The interaction between these two effects
of trade liberalization has been less studied. I study that interaction in this disserta-
tion. Specifically, I study how income inequality among high-income entrepreneurs
(henceforth “top income inequality”) affects the welfare gains from trade for the
average worker.
Although empirical studies have identified capital accumulation as an impor-
1Data are from the World Top Income Database (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez,
2011). The figures above do not include capital gains. Similar trends have been observed for other
countries. For example, the top 5% income share in China increased from 9.8% to 17.8% between
1986 and 2003, while the top 0.1% income share increased from 0.5% to 1.2%.
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tant link between trade openness and economic performance (Levine and Renelt,
1992; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008), the recent literature trying to quantify the gains
from trade has largely abstracted from capital accumulation. However, economists
since Kuznets (1955) and Kaldor (1967) have hypothesized that higher inequality
increases capital accumulation, as higher-income households tend to have higher
saving rates. Therefore, a study of the relationship between top income inequality
and gains from trade should include capital as a factor of production. In this dis-
sertation, I propose a mechanism through which top income inequality affects the
gains from trade, as a result of its effects on the aggregate saving rate and capital
accumulation.
In the second chapter, I develop a dynamic model of trade with incomplete
markets. There are two types of households, workers and entrepreneurs. En-
trepreneurs are ex-ante identical. They cannot undertake inter-temporal borrowing
for consumption, but they are able to rent capital for production without con-
straints within a period.2 They face uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk associ-
ated with their productivity and thus save.3 High-productivity entrepreneurs have
higher current income than their long-term expected income and save aggressively
for consumption-smoothing and precautionary reasons. On the other hand, low-
productivity entrepreneurs have lower current income relative to their long-term
expected income and dis-save from their wealth. The model provides a simple way
of generating a positive relationship between the level of income and the saving rate,
2Both assumptions are relaxed in the robustness checks in Section 2.6.
3Section 2.1.1 discusses the interpretations of entrepreneurs in my model, the importance of
entrepreneurial income for the patterns of top income shares, and evidence of income risk for
entrepreneurs.
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which is both consistent with the data and crucial for the proposed mechanism in
this dissertation. I conjecture that the proposed mechanism would continue to hold
in a setup where the positive saving-income relationship was generated by a different
mechanism, such as wealth-in-the-utility preferences as in Kumhof, Rancière, and
Winant (2014).4
The ex-post heterogeneity in productivity among entrepreneurs translates into
heterogeneity in exporting status, entrepreneurial income, consumption and saving.
Exporting entrepreneurs have both the highest profit and the highest saving rate in
the economy. A reduction in trade costs increases the share of total profits received
by exporters, and thus increases the aggregate supply of capital in the economy. I
refer to this channel as the supply-side channel of capital accumulation. On the
other hand, a reduction in trade costs also increases the demand for capital, as
exporters expand their production to serve foreign markets. I refer to this channel
as the demand-side channel of capital accumulation. The supply-side channel is
novel to this study, while the demand-side channel is also found in previous work,
for example Baldwin (1992). In equilibrium, a reduction in trade costs creates a
large increase in the capital stock.
I calibrate the model using US data and examine the effects of international
trade on aggregate output, the consumption of workers, and the consumption of
entrepreneurs with heterogeneous productivity.5 In the model, international trade
4In a dynastic model where agents are infinitely lived, as is the case in this dissertation, agents
undertake saving for their “dynasties.” The saving motives in these models should be broadly
interpreted as inclusive of bequest motives, which can be more explicitly modeled with finitely
lived agents.
5I calibrate the model to the US economy to be comparable to other works in the literature,
for example, Melitz and Redding (2013).
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increases aggregate output by 2.5% and the wage of workers by 3.4%. On the other
hand, while the aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs is unchanged by interna-
tional trade, the increase in inequality of profits among entrepreneurs implies that
the certainty-equivalent consumption of a typical entrepreneur actually decreases by
4.0%. Capital accumulation plays an important role in the model, accounting for
51.9% of the output gains from trade.
To isolate the effects of the proposed mechanism, I construct a benchmark
model with complete markets, in which firms with heterogeneous productivity are
owned by a single entrepreneur. In this complete markets benchmark, the increase
in aggregate output due to international trade is 1.8% while the increase in the
wage of workers from trade is 2.7%. Therefore, the novel mechanism in my model
increases the wage gains for workers by 25.9%, and the gains in aggregate output
by 38.9%, compared to the complete markets benchmark. I then construct two
additional benchmark models which abstract from capital accumulation, one with
incomplete markets and the other with complete markets. I demonstrate that the
interaction between capital accumulation and top income inequality gives rise to
higher aggregate output gains and higher wage gains. In fact, the model collapses
to a variant of Chaney (2008) when I shut down both top income inequality and
capital accumulation. The increase in aggregate output due to international trade
in the complete markets benchmark without capital is 1.2%, which is the same as
calculated from the formula in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012).6
6Arkolakis et al. (2012) shows that in a wide class of trade models, the gains from trade
for a country can be calculated from the same formula using two sufficient statistics, the import
penetration ratio and the trade elasticity.
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In the third chapter, I test the key predictions of the model using country-level
data. Using fixed-effects regressions in a large panel of countries, I find a significant
and positive correlation between openness and the aggregate saving rate. I find a
much weaker relationship between openness and the investment rate. Additionally, I
build on the gravity-based instrumental-variable (IV) approach pioneered by Frankel
and Romer (1999) and extend it to a panel setting. I find a larger effect of trade
openness on the aggregate saving rate in the fixed-effects panel regressions with IV
than without IV. The results provide strong evidence that a supply-side channel of
increased capital accumulation is operative following an increase in openness, while
the demand-side channel is less evident in the data. I conduct a number of robust-
ness checks to rule out alternative mechanisms for the saving-openness relationship.
In particular, the results are robust to a rich set of control variables including capital
account openness, alternative measures of the aggregate saving rate, and the exclu-
sion of various subsets of countries. Furthermore, I show that greater trade openness
has a stronger effect on the aggregate saving rate in a country where the initial top
10% share of total income (before any changes in trade openness) is higher. This is
in line with the model where the increase in the aggregate saving is driven by top
income earners.
In the fourth chapter, I study the relationship between the household saving
and openness in China through the lens of the framework outlined in the second
chapter. I show that there has been a large increase in top income shares both
among entrepreneurs and workers over the past 30 years in China. Additionally,
there is a very significant and positive correlation between top income shares and
5
the household saving rate across Chinese counties. Using the setting of the 1992
liberalization episode, I find that provinces with a greater increase in openness
experienced a larger increase in the household saving rate during the period. Taken
together, the evidence is supportive of the hypothesis that greater openness increases
the household saving rate in China, by increasing the share of total income received
by the highest-income households who also have the highest saving rate.
This study is related to the literature that aims to quantify the gains from
trade (cf. Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013)). While nearly all quantification
exercises rely on a static framework, I model entrepreneurial consumption, saving
and capital accumulation in a dynamic framework. In their influential economet-
ric analysis, Levine and Renelt (1992) find that the positive correlations between
output growth and the investment rate, and between the investment rate and trade
openness, are two of the only robust results in the empirical cross-country growth
literature.7 Wacziarg (2001) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) show empirically that
capital accumulation is a crucial channel through which trade openness affects eco-
nomic growth. Despite this empirical evidence, most attempts to quantify gains
from trade have abstracted from capital accumulation.8 In the Solow (1956) growth
model, an increase in aggregate TFP raises the marginal product of capital. A
trade liberalization would induce capital accumulation if it increases aggregate TFP
7Levine and Renelt (1992) do not use data on the aggregate saving rate in their analysis.
8Notable exceptions include Alessandria and Choi (forthcoming, 2014) and Alessandria, Choi,
and Ruhl (2014). Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl (2014) calculate the welfare gains from a cut in
tariffs in a model with rich trade adjustment dynamics, taking into account the transition period
between steady states. They find larger gains from trade when accounting for the transition
path than steady-state comparison of consumption. This study abstracts from trade adjustment
dynamics and emphasizes the role of saving by entrepreneurs.
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(Baldwin, 1992).9 My model incorporates this demand-side mechanism into the
framework of Melitz (2003), which does not include capital as a factor of production.
More importantly, this study emphasizes the capital response to a trade liberaliza-
tion coming from the supply side, due to rising inequality. The emphasis on the
supply-side channel is consistent with my empirical finding in the third and fourth
chapters, that greater trade openness is strongly associated with a higher aggregate
saving rate, but not as strongly associated with the investment rate.
The current study is related to the large literature on the effects of international
trade on inequality. Much of the literature has focused on wage inequality between
workers.10 Haskel, Lawrence, Leamer, and Slaughter (2012) argue that globalization
contributes to inequality by increasing the income share of top income earners. The
mechanism linking trade and top income inequality in my study is closely related
to Rosen’s (1981) theory of superstars. Other studies on the relationship between
trade and the income share of superstars include Foellmi and Oechslin (2010) and
Dinopoulos and Unel (2014). In an interesting quantitative exercise, Ma (2013) finds
that increased globalization accounts for about 33 percent of the observed increase
in the top 0.01% income share in the US over the last two decades. These previous
studies are primarily concerned with explaining the observed patterns of inequality.
By contrast, my study attempts to shed light on the welfare implications of this
9Relatedly, Eaton and Kortum (2001) argue that underdeveloped countries have a comparative
disadvantage in producing capital goods, and that international trade facilitates capital accumula-
tion in these countries by reducing the relative price of capital goods. The mechanism emphasized
in the second chapter does not rely on patterns of comparative advantage.
10See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) and Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan (2011) for surveys
of the literature. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) discuss how the literature on trade and inequality
has been shaped by measurement issues.
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increased inequality.
The literatures on the effects of trade on inequality and on the welfare gains
from trade have heretofore evolved largely independently. There are many studies
that use micro-data to examine the impact of a trade liberalization on different
groups, for example by education level. While these studies arguably belong to
both literatures, they do not emphasize the interaction between the effects of trade
on the level of income and on the distribution of income. In the absence of any
interaction between inequality and the gains from trade, one can take the headline
results from both literatures, and assume a social welfare function to calculate the
“the net welfare gains from trade,” taking rising inequality as a cost of trade.11
This dissertation shows that there are non-trivial interactions between top income
inequality and the gains from trade.12 In contrast to the conventional view that
rising inequality is a downside of free trade, I find that accounting for the increase
in top income inequality implies higher gains from trade for the average worker.
Lastly, this study is related to the research on top income shares and their
aggregate implications (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Researchers have noted that top
income shares may have different determinants and welfare implications than the
traditional notions of income inequality such as the skill premium.13 Fairness con-
11Dollar et al. (2014) use a number of social welfare functions to evaluate the relative importance
of changes in average income and inequality changes, for changes to overall social welfare. They
find that changes in average income dominated inequality changes in terms of the effects on social
welfare for a large number of countries over the past 40 years.
12Other works, such asItskhoki (2009), have studied the trade-off between equity and efficiency
in international trade and the policy implications.
13Using data from the Luxembourg Income Study for a sample of 25 developed countries,
Voitchovsky (2005) finds that inequality in the top end of income distribution is positively associ-
ated with income growth, while inequality at the bottom end of income distribution is negatively
associated with income growth.
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cerns and public policy implications are important motivations for the study of top
income shares (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011). Moreover, top income shares
are crucial for aggregate welfare through their potential effects on social stability
or political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2014; Piketty, 2014). Kumhof,
Rancière, and Winant (2014) study the effects of increased top income shares on
leverage and the probability of crises. In their model, the top earners have a higher
saving rate because they have wealth-in-the-utility preferences (Carroll, 2000), while
the saving-income relationship in my model is generated by income fluctuations and
borrowing constraints. In contrast to Kumhof et al. (2014), who focus on the effects
of an exogenous increase of the income share of the top 5% on the probability of
crises, I show that increased concentration within the group of entrepreneurs (the
top earners) can have important welfare implications for the group of workers (the
bottom earners), even if the income shares of these two groups do not change.14 The
focus on welfare implication on inequality within the high-income earners appears
to be novel in the literature.
This study makes four substantive contributions to the literature. First, I
propose a novel mechanism linking top income inequality and the gains from trade
and demonstrate that it is quantitatively relevant for the gains from trade.15 Second,
I help shed light on the welfare implications of top income inequality. I show that
14Empirically, both the income share of the top 5% and the concentration of income within the
top 5% in the US have increased between 1961 and 2005.
15A number of studies have noted a similar theoretical link between overall inequality and
capital accumulation in a closed-economy context (Bourguignon, 1981; Galor and Moav, 2004;
Kaldor, 1967; Kuznets, 1955). Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimüller (2006) provides a comprehensive
review of related literature. The focus on top income inequality in this dissertation is motivated
by the observation that wealth is extremely concentrated.
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increased concentration at the top of income distribution can have positive welfare
implications for the rest of the population.16 Third, I make an empirical contribution
by documenting a strong and positive relationship between trade openness and the
aggregate saving rate at the country level. Lastly, I provide empirical findings to
support a thesis regarding the Chinese saving rate puzzle.
The second chapter presents the theoretical model and the results from the
calibration exercise. The third chapter presents the empirical results from a large
sample of countries. The fourth chapter presents the empirical results from the
liberalization experience of China. The fifth chapter concludes.
16As a concrete example, the bottom 95% in terms of income can have positive welfare gains,
if the income share of the top 0.1% increases at the expense of the rest of the top 5%.
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Chapter 2: A Theory of International Trade and Top Income In-
equality
In this chapter, I present a dynamic model of trade with incomplete markets
and the results from a calibration exercise. One goal of this dissertation is to propose
a novel mechanism and demonstrate its quantitative relevance. Towards this end,
I compare the results from the full model with those from comparable benchmark
models. To facilitate the comparison, I deliberately keep the full model simple. I
examine the robustness of the model to alternative assumptions, and extensions of
the full model, in Section 2.6.
2.1 Environment
2.1.1 Entrepreneurs
There are two symmetric countries. Each country has a unit mass of en-
trepreneurs who produce differentiated goods. Entrepreneurs are infinitely lived and
differentiated by their productivity z. Productivity z is drawn from a time-invariant
cumulative distribution function (CDF) µ(z). In each period, an entrepreneur re-
ceives a new draw of z from the CDF µ(z) with probability (1− γ).
11










where β is the discount factor, λ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ct is
the final good (the numeraire). I use the concept of stationary equilibrium in the
analysis. From the perspective of an entrepreneur, in a stationary equilibrium, the
only stochastic element in the economy is the evolution of idiosyncratic productivity
z. As a result, in a stationary equilibrium, the expectation in Equation (2.1) is taken
with respect to z.
Entrepreneurs in the model are intended to represent executives and entrepreneurs
in the real world. Using data on US tax returns, Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012) re-
port that non-finance executives, managers and supervisors account for 40.9% of pri-
mary taxpayers in the top 0.1% of income tax-units in 2004. For about half of these
executive households, the sum of self-employment, partnership and S-Corporation
income is higher than salary income. Therefore, both executive income and en-
trepreneurial income are significant components of top income shares. Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006) document that 68% of households in the top 5% of wealth are
business owners or self-employed in the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances data.
A crucial assumption is that these higher-income households face uninsur-
able income risk associated with the performance of firms. Clementi and Cooley
(2010) show that executive compensation is closely tied to innovations in share-
holder wealth. There is also substantial evidence that income risk associated with
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entrepreneurial activities is particularly difficult to insure against. Guvenen (2007)
analyzes the extent of risk sharing among stockholders (more wealthy individu-
als) and non-stockholders in the US. Using PSID data, he rejects perfect risk
sharing among stockholders but does not reject perfect risk sharing among non-
stockholders. Guvenen (2007) concludes that market incompleteness matters more
for the wealthy, who face substantial entrepreneurial risk. Moreover, precaution-
ary saving by entrepreneurs has been identified as an essential element to account
for the extreme concentration of wealth in the right tail in US data (Cagetti and
De Nardi, 2006; Quadrini, 2000). Lastly, Gentry and Hubbard (2004) find that
entrepreneurial households have higher wealth-to-income ratios and higher saving
rates than non-entrepreneurial households.
2.1.2 Workers
There is a unit measure of infinitely lived workers in each country. Each
worker supplies a unit of labor and receives a wage. Since there is no idiosyncratic
or aggregate income risk for workers in a stationary equilibrium, it is optimal for
workers to simply consume their wages in each period. In other words, entrepreneurs
account for all of the aggregate wealth in the economy.
In reality, there is a lot of heterogenity among workers, and there is extensive
evidence that trade openness increases wage inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007;
Harrison et al., 2011). To the extent that the saving rate is also increasing in income
among workers, an increase in wage inequality can increase the aggregate saving by
13
workers and capital accumulation, through a mechanism similar to that in this
paper. However, wealth is very concentrated empirically. According to Saez and
Zucman (2014), the top 10% households in terms of wealth accounted for 77.2%
of total wealth in the US in 2012. Over the period 1986-2012, the average private
saving rate for the bottom 90% in wealth is 0%, compared to 22% for top 10% in
wealth (Saez and Zucman, 2014). In view of these empirical findings, I abstract
from worker heterogeneity and savings by workers. With this setup, the welfare of
a worker is simply his wage, which is the marginal product of labor. This allows
me to illustrate the interaction between income inequality among entrepreneurs and
workers’ welfare.
2.1.3 The Final Good Sector
Each country has a perfectly competitive final good sector. I use superscript
∗ to denote prices, quantities and policy functions in the foreign country. A single
representative firm in each country combines differentiated goods, produced domes-









where q(i) is the amount of differentiated good i and σ > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution in production. Taking the output price P and input prices p(i) as
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The inverse demand function for variety i coming from the final good sector















are the aggregate expenditure
and the price index in that country, respectively. Perfect competition and con-
stant returns to scale in the production function imply zero profit in equilibrium
for the representative final good firm. In equilibrium, P ∗ = P = 1 with symmetric
countries.
2.1.4 Production of Differentiated Goods and International Trade
I assume monopolistic competition for producers of differentiated goods. Ad-
ditionally, there is no firm entry or exit. An entrepreneur with productivity z(i)
produces a variety i of differentiated goods according to
q(i) = z(i)k(i)αl(i)1−α, (2.5)
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where k(i) and l(i) are capital input and labor input in production, respectively.
When feasible, I omit the index i from the notation in what follows.
Only differentiated goods are tradable between the two countries. In order to
export, firms incur a per-period fixed cost of fX in units of labor.
1 There is no sunk
cost of exporting. Lastly, there is an iceberg variable cost of trade, τ ≥ 1. Exporters
have to ship τ units for every unit of goods sold in the other country.
I do not specify a sunk cost of exporting for two reasons. First, this assump-
tion allows me to derive analytical results on the effect of international trade on
inequality. Second, as I will make clear below, the absence of sunk costs facilitates
the construction and calibration of a benchmark alternative model which has a rep-
resentative entrepreneur. In Section 2.6.1, I show that my results are robust to
allowing for a sunk cost of exporting.
2.1.5 Capital Rental Market
Capital is immobile across countries.2 Capital depreciates at rate δ. The
capital rental market is perfectly competitive. For each unit of intermediated capital,
a financial intermediary receives R in rental payment from entrepreneurs, pays out
r as interest payment to depositors, and spends δ to replace the depreciated capital.
Financial intermediaries are collectively owned by the entrepreneur population.
I assume that entrepreneurs cannot have negative wealth (a ≥ 0). The no-
1A possible alternative is to specify this fixed cost in final goods. However, Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2013) note that under this specification, as aggregate TFP increases following a
decrease in variable trade costs, the amount of resources devoted to fixed costs is reduced. This
creates another source for gains from trade. I abstract from this additional channel.
2With the assumption of symmetric countries, allowing capital mobility across countries does
not affect any of the results presented in this chapter.
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borrowing constraint (a ≥ 0) and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk imply that en-
trepreneurs engage in precautionary saving. In Section 2.6.2, I examine the implica-
tions of relaxing the no-borrowing constraint. Entrepreneurs can rent any amount
of capital within each period. That is, the rental of capital for production is not sub-
ject to financial frictions.3 Consequently, conditional on productivity, the demand
for capital by a firm is not a function of entrepreneurial wealth a. Export status,
factor inputs, sales and profits of firms can be written as functions of productivity
z alone. In Section 2.6.3, I show that the results are robust to an alternative setting
where the demand for capital by entrepreneurs is constrained by their wealth.
2.1.6 Dynamic Budget Constraint
The dynamic budget constraint of an entrepreneur is given by
c+ a′ = max{πD(z), πX(z)}+ (1 + r)a,
where a ≥ 0 is the beginning-of-period wealth of the entrepreneur and r is the
interest rate received by depositors. The profit functions πj(z), j = D,X, where D












−R · k − w · l
}
s.t qD = zkαl1−α
3There is a large literature on the interactions between financial frictions and international
















σ −R · k − w · l − w · fX
}
s.t qD + τqX = zkαl1−α
where qD and qX are total domestic sales and total export sales respectively.
2.1.7 Timing of the Model
The timing of the model is given below.
1. Entrepreneurs enter a period with wealth a and observe productivity z. An
entrepreneur’s state is given by the pair (a, z). Entrepreneurs deposit their
wealth a with financial intermediaries.
2. Entrepreneurs choose export status e(z) ∈ {0, 1}, capital input k(z) and vari-
able labor input l(z) for the current period. Financial intermediaries rent out
capital to firms. Each worker supplies one unit of labor.
3. Production of differentiated goods takes place. Capital depreciates at rate δ
during production.
4. Production and sales of the final good take place. Simultaneously, entrepreneurs
receive revenue; pay capital rentals and wages to the financial intermediaries
and workers; receive their deposits including interest payment, (1+r)a, from fi-
nancial intermediaries; and purchase and consume the final good c(a, z). Each
worker receives and consumes a wage.
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5. Entrepreneurs enter the next period with wealth a′(a, z).
Note that entrepreneur decisions e(z), a′(a, z), c(a, z), k(z) and l(z) can be made
simultaneously (instead of sequentially) after productivity z is observed, since there
is no uncertainty within a period.
2.1.8 An Entrepreneur’s Problem
Since there is no aggregate risk in this model, the domestic wage w, interest
rate r, capital rental rate R, aggregate price index P , and total expenditure E are
time-invariant in a stationary equilibrium, as are the corresponding variables in the
foreign country. An entrepreneur chooses export status e(z), asset position a′(a, z),
consumption c(a, z), variable labor input l(z), capital input k(z), domestic sales
qD(z) and export sales qX(z) (for exporters only).
An entrepreneur chooses consumption c and assets a′ to maximize expected
utility, subject to the budget constraint:









s.t. c+ a′ ≤ max{πD(z), πX(z)}+ (1 + r)a.
As is well known, the fixed cost of exporting fX introduces a productivity
cutoff z̄X for participation in exporting, given by the solution to π
D(z̄X) = π
X(z̄X).
The cutoff z̄X is given by











σ−σ(σ − 1)(σ−1). Equation (2.6) indicates that the
export productivity cutoff is increasing in the fixed cost of exporting and factor
prices, and is decreasing in foreign market size (E∗). Only entrepreneurs with z ≥ z̄X
become exporters.
2.1.9 Definition of a Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
The definition of a stationary competitive equilibrium with international trade
includes an invariant distribution of entrepreneurs over the (a, z) space, a set of
prices, and a set of policy functions in each country satisfying a list of equilibrium
conditions. I state the equilibrium conditions for the domestic economy below.
Analogous conditions hold for the foreign economy.
1. Given aggregate variables w, R, r, P , E, and the corresponding variables in
the foreign country, the policy functions c(a, z), a′(a, z), e(z), l(z), k(z), qD(z)
and qX(z) solve an entrepreneur’s optimization problem.
2. Each worker supplies one unit of labor and optimally chooses to consume his
wage each period.
3. Financial intermediaries make zero profit in equilibrium. This implies
R = r + δ.
4. The markets for capital rental, labor and the final good clear. Trade balances.
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Both integrals are taken over the entire entrepreneur population. The
left-hand side gives the total demand for capital while the right hand side
gives the total supply of capital in the economy. The letter K denotes
the stock of capital in a stationary equilibrium.










G(da, dz) = 1
The first integral on the left-hand side is taken over the entire entrepreneur
population and gives total demand for variable labor input. The second
integral is taken over all exporting entreprenerus and gives total labor
used as fixed costs of exporting. The right-hand side of the equation
gives the total labor supply (normalized to 1).











The integrals in the equation above are taken with respect to all exporters
in the home country and in the foreign country respectively.
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c(a, z)G(da, dz) + w + δ ·K = Y (2.7)
In a stationary equilibrium, the final good is either consumed or used
to replace depreciated capital. The first integral on the left-hand side
is taken with respect to the entrepreneur population. The second term
is total consumption by workers. The first two terms are thus the total
consumption in the economy. The third term on the left-hand side gives
the depreciation of capital. Finally, Y is the total output of the final
good in the economy.
5. The joint distribution of wealth a and entrepreneurial productivity z is a fixed














for all (a, z). Equation (2.8) states that for any point (a, z), the CDF at this
point (LHS) should be equal to the CDF at the same point next period (RHS).
Consider a point (ā, z̄). The CDF at (ā, z̄) this period is given by G(ā, z̄). The
CDF in the following period consists of two components. For the γ fraction
in the population whose entrepreneur productivity z remains unchanged, I
integrate over the entrepreneurs with z ≤ z̄ whose policy functions place them
22
at a′ ≤ ā. For the (1− γ) fraction in the entrepreneur population who receive
a new z, I integrate over all entrepreneurs whose policy functions place them
at a′ ≤ ā. The integral is multiplied by µ(z̄) since only a fraction µ(z̄) will
have z ≤ z̄ after the redraw of z.
2.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model to US data at annual frequency. The model is solved
numerically using parallel computing. The computational algorithm is described
in detail in Appendix 2A. Table 2.1 summarizes the parameter choices and target
moments in the calibration exercise.
Following Buera and Shin (2013), I set the coefficient of relative risk aversion λ
at 1.5, the share of capital in production α at 0.333, and the one-year depreciation
rate of capital δ at 0.06. I set the elasticity of substitution σ at 5.0, which is
close to the estimates by Simonovska and Waugh (2014). The implied markup for
differentiated goods is 25%.
The model specifies an exogenous distribution of entrepreneurial productivity.
Following Chaney (2008), I assume that productivity follows a Pareto distribution.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) for entrepreneurial productivity is given
by
µ(z) = Pr(Z ≤ z) = 1− z−η, z ≥ 1,
where η is the shape parameter that governs the dispersion of entrepreneurial pro-
ductivity. There is a one-to-one mapping between entrepreneurial productivity and
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domestic sales. As shown in di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013), the distribution of
domestic sales is given by
Pr(S > s) = B · sζ ,
where B is some constant, and ζ = η
σ−1 is the tail parameter of the Pareto dis-
tribution of firm sales. Melitz and Redding (2013) uses a value of 1.3 for the tail
parameter. However, γ also governs the income distribution of entrepreneur in the
model. Empirically, income follows a Pareto distribution with a tail parameter of
around 1.7 for the US over 1991-2000 (Alvaredo et al., 2011) . I set the tail index of
the firm sales distribution to ζ = 1.5. The implied shape parameter η for produc-
tivity is η = ζ × (σ − 1) = 6.0. I choose γ = 0.814 to match the persistence of firm
productivity reported in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).
I calibrate the remaining parameters to match a number of moments from
the US economy.4 I set the discount factor β at 0.952 to match an annual interest
rate of 3.0%. In this model, as in Melitz (2003), the ratio of export revenue to
total sales for exporters is fixed at τ
1−σ
1+τ1−σ
. In the data, across all exporters in U.S
manufacturing, the share of exports in total shipments was 14.0% in 2002 (Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007). To match this ratio, I set the variable trade
cost τ to 1.57. I choose fX = 0.090 to match the import penetration ratio of 7.0%
for the US in 2000.
In the counter-factual experiment, I increase the variable trade cost to infinity
4In the following description, it is understood that the moments are affected by the parameters
jointly, but some moments may be more sensitive to changes in certain parameters.
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Table 2.1: Calibration
Panel A: Parameters Taken from Prior Literature
Full Model CM Benchmark
Parameter Symbol Value Value
Coefficient of Risk Aversion λ 1.500 -
Share of Capital in Production α 0.333 0.333
Capital Depreciation Rate δ 0.060 0.060
Elasticity of Substitution σ 5.000 5.000
Persistence of Firm Productivity γ 0.814 -
Shape Parameter of Sales Distribution ζ 1.500 1.500
Panel B: Parameters Calibrated to Match Data Moments
Full Model CM Benchmark
Target Moment US Data Parameter Model Parameter Model
Interest Rate 3.0% β = 0.952 3.0% β = 0.971 3.0%
Import Penetration Ratio 7.0% fEX = 0.09 7.0% fEX = 0.09 7.0%
Export to Sales Ratio 14.0% τ = 1.57 14.0% τ = 1.57 14.0%
“Full Model” refers to the model described in Section 2.1; “CM Benchmark” refers to the
complete markets benchmark described in Section 2.2.1
to shut down international trade. This allows us to infer the realized gains from
trade in the US. I refer to the economy matching the observed level of trade as
“Trade” and the counter-factual economy as “Autarky”.
2.2.1 Complete Markets Benchmark (CM Benchmark)
One goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that entrepreneurial income in-
equality plays a critical role for the gains from trade. It is instructive to describe
a benchmark model in which markets are complete, and to compare the results
from the benchmark model to the full model. Towards this end, I introduce a rep-
resentative entrepreneur in each country who receives the income of all the firms,
while allowing the firms with heterogeneous productivity to make profit-maximizing
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decisions independently. This aggregates away the idiosyncratic risks. I refer to
the benchmark model with complete markets as the “CM benchmark.” In the CM
benchmark, firms are heterogeneous, but entrepreneurial income, consumption and
saving are homogeneous.
As in the full model, firms are differentiated by productivity z, drawn from






where u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0,5 subject to the dynamic budget constraint
ct + at+1 =
∫
max{πD(z), πX(z)}µ(dz) + (1 + r)at (2.10)
where πD(z) and πX(z) are the profit functions of a domestic firm and an exporting
firm respectively. The production function for differentiated goods implies that
the interest rate r approaches infinity when a = 0. Therefore, the representative
entrepreneur holds a positive level of assets to smooth consumption over time. The
absence of sunk costs implies that the production side is essentially static: it is
irrelevant whether a particular entrepreneur’s productivity z is stochastic, as long
as the distribution of z is constant over time.
The final good sector, the differentiated goods sector and the capital rental
market are identical to their counterparts in the full model.
5Note that this is more general than the CRRA utility function in the full model. The exact
functional form of utility does not matter for the complete markets benchmark.
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I consider the stationary equilibrium for the benchmark model. A stationary
competitive equilibrium with international trade is defined as a set of prices and
policy functions such that
1. The policy functions maximize the utility of the representative entrepreneur.
2. Each firm maximizes profit each period.
3. Workers optimally choose to consume their wage each period.
4. All markets clear.
5. Trade balances.
To solve the model, I obtain the first-order conditions for the maximization problem
given by Equations (2.9) and (2.10). I obtain the stationary equilibrium by imposing
ct = c̄ and at = ā for any t. It is straightforward to show that r =
1
β
− 1 in any
stationary equilibrium. This contrasts with the full model in which the equilibrium
interest rate is affected by a myriad of parameters, including the probability of
expiration of ideas γ, capital share α, discount factor β and coefficient of relative
risk aversion λ.
It is instructive to consider the static problem of finding the equilibrium wage
to clear markets, taking the interest rate as exogenous. For a given equilibrium
interest rate and a given set of parameter values on the production side, the op-
timization problem faced by firms in the benchmark model is the same as in the
full model.6 By choosing a different value of β for the benchmark model so that
6The parameters on the production side are α, δ, σ, ζ, fX and τ .
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the equilibrium interest rate is identical across the two models, the labor market
in the benchmark model can be cleared using the equilibrium wage from the full
model. I target an equilibrium interest rate of 3.00% for the full model. To have the
same interest rate in the CM benchmark, I simply set β = 1
1+0.0300
= 0.971. This
procedure produces an identical equilibrium wage and target moments across the
two models. This feature of the calibration allows for an appropriate comparison
across the two models.
To summarize, I construct the CM benchmark by assuming that all firms in a
country are owned by one representative entrepreneur. Each firm makes exporting
and input decisions independently to maximize income. The rest of the CM bench-
mark is essentially identical to the full model. The same set of parameter values,
other than the value of β, can be used to calibrate both models to the US data.7
The details on the calibration of the CM benchmark are presented in Table 2.1.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 The Impact of International Trade on Inequality
Before presenting the results on gains from trade in this model, I first examine
the effects of trade on inequality. Although the model is dynamic in nature, the
production decisions of entrepreneurs are static. This allows us to derive some
analytical results.
7As noted earlier, the exact functional form of static utility does not matter for stationary
equilibrium in the CM benchmark. The absence of sunk costs implies that the parameter γ, which
governs the persistence of firm productivity, does not matter in the CM benchmark.
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2.3.1.1 Analytical Results
Proposition 1: Moving from Autarky (τ =∞) to any positive level of trade
(τ <∞, e(z) = 1 for some z), the profit share of the top x% of entrepreneurs strictly
increases for any x ∈ (0, 100), for any non-degenerate CDF function µ(z).
Proof: See Appendix 2B.
The intuition of the proof is straightforward. Define zx as implicitly as satis-
fying µ(zx) = 1 − x100 . In Autarky, the profit share of the top x% of entrepreneurs
















where πD(.) is defined earlier and zmin is the minimum possible z (normalized to
1 in the calibration). This ratio is preserved if we consider profits from domestic
sales alone in an economy with trade. Given the fixed cost of exporting, if there
are any exporters in the economy, they must first come from the top x%. When
moving to trade, there is an additional term involving profits from export sales
added to both the denominator and the numerator of Equation (2.11). The proof
in Appendix 2B demonstrates that the numerator in Equation (2.11) necessarily
increases proportionally more than the denominator when a country opens up to
trade. A corollary of Proposition 1 is that the Gini coefficient of profits among
entrepreneurs is minimized at Autarky.
It is important to emphasize that Proposition 1 considers only the distribution
of profit income among entrepreneurs. The distribution of interest income is deter-
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mined by dynamic factors such as the persistence of profit income and risk aversion,
so it is difficult to examine analytically.
The effects of trade on the inequality between workers and entrepreneurs are
summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Consider the special case of the model in which there is no capital
depreciation (δ = 0). Moving from Autarky (τ = ∞) to any positive level of trade
(τ < ∞, e(z) = 1 for some z), the share of total income received by the workers
increases.
Proof: See Appendix 2B.
With constant mark-up and Cobb-Douglass production, total variable profit,
total cost of capital rental and total cost of variable labor input are fixed in propor-
tion across all firms, regardless of the level of trade cost. However, as more firms
start to export, more labor is used to cover the fixed cost of exporting. As a result,
total labor income increases relative to total entrepreneurial income. Also, since the
markup of price over marginal cost is constant, the percentage markup of price over
average cost is lower at exporting firms, as a result of the fixed cost of exporting.
Therefore, compared to Autarky, total profit (net of the fixed cost of exporting) as a
share of total sales is lower in an economy with any positive level of trade (τ <∞).
Therefore, in moving from Autarky (τ =∞) to any positive level of trade (τ <∞),
the share of total income received by the workers increases.
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2.3.1.2 Numerical Results
Section 2.3.1.1 presents some analytical results concerning the effects of trade
on income inequality. However, Proposition 1 does not consider the distribution
of interest income. Since the distribution of interest income is a function of the
equilibrium wealth distribution, it is difficult to provide analytical results concerning
the effect of trade on the distribution of overall entrepreneurial income. I turn to
numerical results.
Table 2.2: The Effect of Trade on Inequality
Panel A. Income Inequality among Entrepreneurs
Autarky Trade
Share of Total Entrepreneurial Income
Top 1% 18.8% 20.1%
Top 2-5% 18.6% 19.4%
Top 5-20% 23.0% 22.7%
Top 20-50% 21.8% 20.9%
Bottom 50% 17.9% 17.0%
Gini Coefficient 0.538 0.558
Panel B. Income Distribution Between Workers and Entrepreneurs
Autarky Trade
Workers Share of Total Income 64.7% 65.4%
“Autarky” refers to the economy when the variable cost of trade is set to infinity;
“Trade” refers to the economy calibrated to match the observed level of trade in
the US.
As shown in Panel A of Table 2.2, international trade increases the share
of overall entrepreneurial income received by the most productive entrepreneurs.
Moving from Autarky to Trade, the share of overall entrepreneurial income received
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by the top 1% increases from 18.8% to 20.1%, while the share received by the top
5% (including the top 1%) increases from 37.4% to 39.5%. On the other hand, the
share of overall entrepreneurial income received by the bottom 50% decreases from
17.9% to 17.0%. The Gini coefficient among entrepreneurs increases, from 0.538
under Autarky to 0.558 under Trade.
The effects of trade openness on income inequality among entrepreneurs, as
presented in Panel A of Table 2.2, are modest. Total income of an entrepreneur is
the sum of profit income π and interest income a · r, which are positively correlated
in the model. Moving from Autarky to Trade, the interest rate r decreases from
3.15% to 3.00%. As a result, the increase in the inequality of profit income for
entrepreneurs is partially offset by a decrease in the equilibrium interest rate, in
the sense that interest income does not increase proportionally with profit income
for the exporters. In Section 2.3.3, I show that this modest increase in top income
inequality can nevertheless have large welfare implications for the workers.
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents the results on the distribution of income between
the entrepreneurs and the workers. Moving from Autarky to Trade, the share of total
income received by workers increases from 64.7% to 65.4%. This is consistent with
Proposition 2. However, the central mechanism of this chapter linking inequality to
saving is driven by income inequality among entrepreneurs, rather than by inequality
between workers and entrepreneurs. In fact, an increase in the workers’ share works
against the proposed mechanism, since workers do not save at all in the model.
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2.3.2 The Impact of Trade on Aggregate Output
The model implies an aggregate production function for the final good as
follows:
Y = TFP ·Kα (2.12)
where Y, TFP, and K are the aggregate output of the final good, aggregate total
factor productivity (TFP) and aggregate capital stock respectively. Aggregate TFP











where Lv denotes total labor used as variable input, and the second term is the
weighted harmonic mean of productivity over all firms. The first integral of the
second term is taken with respect to non-exporting firms while the second integral
is taken with respect to exporting firms. Moving from Autarky (τ = ∞) to any
positive level of trade (τ < ∞, e(z) = 1 for some z), the aggregate TFP in the
economy increases, since high-productivity entrepreneurs increase their production
relative to the non-exporters (Melitz, 2003).









Equation (2.14) shows that the change in aggregate output can be decomposed
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into contributions from the increase in aggregate TFP and from the increase in the
capital stock. The percentage contributions from the increase in TFP and from












Table 2.3: The Impact of Trade on Aggregate Output
Change in Aggregate Output Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model Full Model CM Benchmark Full Model CM Benchmark
TFP 1.2% 1.2% 48.1% 66.7%
Capital 3.9% 1.8% 51.9% 33.3%
Output 2.5% 1.8% 100.0% 100.0%
“Full Model” refers to the model described in Section 2.1; “CM Benchmark” refers
to the complete markets benchmark described in Section 2.2.1.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.3 summarize the impact of trade on aggregate
output. In the full model, when we move from Autarky to Trade, aggregate out-
put increases by 2.5%. In the CM benchmark, aggregate output increases by 1.8%,
0.7 percentage points less than in the full model. Therefore, the mechanism in my
model increases the gains in aggregate output by 38.9%, compared to the complete
markets benchmark. Crucially, the percentage change in aggregate TFP is identical
across the two models. The difference in output gains from trade is solely driven
by the difference in capital accumulation. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.3 present
the decomposition of the output gains from trade for both models. Capital accu-
mulation plays a more important role in the full model than in the CM benchmark.
Increased capital accumulation accounts for 51.9% of the output gains from trade
in the full model, compared to 33.3% in the CM benchmark. It is also important to
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Figure 2.1: Average Saving Rate And Entrepreneur Productivity z
Entrepreneurial Productivity Percentile



























I define an entrepreneur’s saving rate as a
′−a
y
, where y = π + a · r is the
entrepreneur’s overall income. Average saving rate is calculated as the total
saving of entrepreneurs (sum of (a′ − a)) with a given z (but different a),
divided by their total income. The figure starts at the 30th percentile of
productivity, as I group the entrepreneurs in the first three productivity
deciles together when solving the model numerically.
note that the contribution of capital accumulation to the output gains from trade is
quantitatively large in both models. The decomposition exercise shows the impor-
tance of explicitly accounting for capital accumulation in attempts to quantify the
gains from trade.
In the full model, there is a 3.9% increase in the capital stock as we move
from Autarky to Trade. The capital stock increases through two channels. First,
the reduction in variable trade costs increases the demand for capital, as exporters
expand their production to serve foreign markets. This is analogous to the increase
in the demand for labor in Melitz (2003).
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Second, the reduction in trade costs increases the supply of capital. Figure 2.1
shows that the average saving rate of entrepreneurs in the full model is strongly in-
creasing in entrepreneurial productivity z.8,9 High-productivity entrepreneurs have
higher current income than their long-term expected income and save aggressively
for consumption-smoothing and precautionary reasons. On the other hand, low-
productivity entrepreneurs have lower current income relative to their long-term
expected income and dis-save from their wealth.10 Since greater trade openness
increases the share of profits received by the most productive entrepreneurs, there
is a substantial increase in the aggregate supply of capital in the economy. Conse-
quently, the interest rate in equilibrium decreases from 3.15% to 3.00% as we move
from Autarky to Trade. In contrast, in the CM Benchmark, the equilibrium interest
rate is the same for Autarky and Trade at 3.00%. The capital stock increases by
1.8%, substantially less than the 3.4% increase in the full model. This confirms the
quantitative importance of the supply-side channel emphasized in this chapter.
In principle, there are two mechanisms by which moving from Autarky to Trade
can affect aggregate saving. First, moving to trade increases the income share of the
8I define an entrepreneur’s saving rate as a
′−a
y , where y = π+a · r is the entrepreneur’s overall
income. The average saving rate for a given z is calculated as the total saving of entrepreneurs
(sum of (a′ − a)) with a given z (but different a), divided by their total income.
9Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) document a steep positive relationship between the saving
rate and income. They find some evidence that the relationship is in part driven by uncertainty
with respect to income, as is the case in this chapter. Carroll (2000) argues that the saving behavior
of the rich is best explained by a model in which wealth enters the utility function of individuals
directly. In his model, individuals regard accumulation of wealth as an end in itself. I conjecture
that the supply-side channel of capital accumulation would remain if I instead used the approach
of Carroll (2000) to generate a positive relationship between the saving rate and income.
10The positive relationship between the saving rate and current income also plays an impor-
tant role in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2012) and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2014) who use
a heterogeneous-agent model with occupational choice to evaluate the aggregate implications of
micro-finance and asset granting programs respectively.
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most productive entrepreneurs, who have higher saving rates. Second, moving to
trade increases income uncertainty, which may encourage additional precautionary
saving for any given level of income.
To shed light on the mechanism behind the increase in the supply of capital,
I group the entrepreneurs by their productivity z and conduct two counter-factual
experiments.11 First, I fix the average saving rate of each z group at its level under
Autarky, and change the income shares of each group to the income shares under
Trade. This results in an increase of 1.72% in the aggregate saving rate among en-
trepreneurs. Second, I fix the income shares of each z group under their levels under
Autarky, and change the average saving rate of each group to the saving rate under
Trade. This results in a decrease of 1.83% in the aggregate saving rate. The decom-
position exercise suggests that the change in income shares among entrepreneurs,
rather than increases in the saving rates for given levels of z, is behind the increase
in the supply of capital. Appendix 2C provides details of the experiments above, as
part of a decomposition exercise on the change in the aggregate saving rate.12
I conduct an additional decomposition exercise on the change in the aggre-
gate target-wealth-to-profit ratio, where the target wealth of an entrepreneur with
productivity z is his steady-state wealth if the entrepreneur were to receive the
11It is not possible to match the entrepreneurs by (a, z) between Autarky and Trade because
the joint distribution of (a, z) is an endogenous object. Therefore, I group the entrepreneurs by z
instead of by (a, z).
12In a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate saving rate of entrepreneurs is 0. A crucial point is
that capital depreciation takes place inside financial intermediaries in this model, and entrepreneurs
earn only the net return of saving. This is proven in Appendix 2C. In the model, by changing income
shares of entrepreneurs, international trade increases the aggregate saving rate of entrepreneurs in a
partial-equilibrium sense. In general equilibrium, the aggregate saving rate of entrepreneurs returns
to 0 through the equilibrium adjustment of the interest rate. The partial-equilibrium increase in
the aggregate saving rate is reflected in the higher capital stock in general equilibrium.
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same z forever. The decomposition exercise shows that the change in profit shares
among entrepreneurs, rather than an increase in the individual-level target-wealth-
to-profit ratio, is behind the increase in the aggregate capital stock. The details of
the decomposition exercise are also presented in Appendix 2C.
2.3.3 Welfare Gains from Trade
Having quantified the effect of trade openness on aggregate output, I examine
the welfare implications of trade. In both models, welfare gains from trade may differ
from output gains because some final good is used to replace depreciated capital.
Moreover, as shown in Section 2.3.1, international trade affects the distribution of
income among entrepreneurs, as well as the distribution of income between workers
and entrepreneurs. It is important to examine the effects of trade on the welfare of
workers and of entrepreneurs separately.13
In both models, workers face no income risk and simply consume their wage
each period. A natural measure of workers’ welfare is the equilibrium wage. In
contrast to workers, entrepreneurs are heterogeneous and face idiosyncratic income
risk. I measure the welfare of entrepreneurs in two ways. The first measure of en-
trepreneur welfare is simply the aggregate consumption of all entrepreneurs. The
second measure of welfare is the certainty-equivalent consumption of a typical en-
trepreneur. Since there is no consumption heterogeneity in the CM benchmark,
certainty-equivalent consumption is the same as aggregate consumption. For the
13To consider aggregate welfare, I would need to take a stand on the relative weights of en-
trepreneurs and workers in the social welfare function. I do not pursue this approach.
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full model, certainty-equivalent consumption is calculated in two steps. First, I
calculate the average utility of entrepreneurs in a stationary equilibrium.14 This is
the expected utility of an entrepreneur chosen randomly from the economy at any
point in time. Second, I use the static utility function to back out the “certainty
equivalent” consumption that corresponds to the expected utility from the first step.
The resulting welfare measure is expressed in units of the final good. Compared to
aggregate consumption, certainty-equivalent consumption takes the distributional
effects of trade into consideration.
Table 2.4: Welfare Gains from Trade






“Full Model” refers to the model described in Section 2.1; “CM
Benchmark” refers to the complete markets benchmark described
in Section 2.2.1.
Table 2.4 presents the effects of international trade on welfare. Consider the
results from the full model. The increase in the wage is 3.4%. Interestingly, aggre-
gate entrepreneurial consumption is unchanged by international trade. The change
in aggregate consumption for entrepreneurs is zero by numerical rounding and would
change under different levels of openness.15 There is a 4.0% decrease of certainty-
14Stationary equilibrium implies that I only have to look at a single period.
15If I keep more decimal places, the increase in aggregate entrepreneurial consumption is 0.003%
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equivalent consumption for entrepreneurs. Intuitively, the distribution of consump-
tion among entrepreneurs becomes more dispersed when moving from Autarky to
Trade.
The differences between the two models in the responses of output and the
capital stock translate into differences in welfare gains for workers. In the CM
benchmark, the increase in the wage is only 2.7%, lower than that in the full model.
Therefore, the novel mechanism in my model increases the wage gains for workers
by 25.9%, compared to the complete markets benchmark. As in the full model,
aggregate entrepreneur consumption in the CM benchmark is unchanged from in-
ternational trade.
2.3.4 The Role of Risk Aversion
The saving behavior of entrepreneurs plays a very important role in the full
model. A critical parameter governing saving behavior is λ, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. In the calibration of the full model, I set λ at 1.5. To understand the
role of λ in the model, I vary the value of λ. Since a larger value of λ drives down
the equilibrium interest rate, to maintain an equilibrium interest rate of 3.0%, I pick
a different value of the discount factor β for each value of λ. In other words, I use
different combinations of λ and β to obtain the same target interest rate of 3.0%
while maintaining all other parameter values as given in Table 2.1. First, I set λ
to 1.0, which corresponds to the log utility function. To match the target interest
rate, I set β to 0.959. I then set λ to 2.0. To match the target interest rate, I set β
and 0.038% under the full model and CM benchmark respectively.
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at 0.945.
The gains from trade implied by different values of λ and β for the full model
are presented in Table 2.5. The baseline results implied by λ = 1.5, β = 0.952 are
reproduced in Column (2) for easy comparison. The impact of trade on aggregate
TFP and aggregate entrepreneurial consumption are identical across the different
combinations of λ and β.
Column (1) presents gains from trade assuming less risk aversion (λ = 1.0,
β = 0.959). The percentage increase in the capital stock due to trade is now smaller
at 3.3%. The smaller increase in capital stock translates into smaller output gains
from trade (2.3%) and smaller wage gains for workers (3.3%). However, certainty-
equivalent entrepreneurial consumption decreases by only 3.3% instead of 4.0%, as
lower risk aversion implies that entrepreneurs do not suffer as large a loss in expected
utility due to increased income dispersion under trade.
Column (3) of Table 2.5 presents the results when I assume more risk aversion
(λ = 2.0, β = 0.945). The percentage increase in the capital stock due to trade is now
higher, at 4.7%. The output gains from trade and wage gains are also higher, while
certainty-equivalent entrepreneurial consumption decreases by a larger percentage
(4.4%) than in the baseline calibration.
As in Section 2.3.2, I conduct two experiments to analyze the change in the
aggregate saving rate of entrepreneurs. First, I fix the average saving rate of each
z group at Autarky and change the income shares of each group to the income
shares under Trade. This results in an increase of 1.68, 1.72, and 1.80 percentage
points in the aggregate saving rate among entrepreneurs, for λ = 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0,
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Table 2.5: The Role of Coefficient of Relative Risk
Aversion λ in the Full Model
(1) (2) (3)
Parameter Values
λ 1.00 1.50 2.00
β 0.959 0.952 0.945
Percentage Change in Aggregate Output
TFP 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
Capital 3.3% 3.9% 4.7%
Output 2.3% 2.5% 2.8%
Consumption of Workers
Wage 3.3% 3.4% 3.7%
Entrepreneurial Consumption
Aggregate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Certainty-Equivalent -3.3% -4.0% -4.4%
Column (1) presents the results when a log utility function
is used. For each alternative value of λ, the parameter β is
re-calibrated to match a real interest rate of 3.00%.
respectively. Second, I fix the income shares of each z group under Autarky and
change the average saving rate of each group to the saving rate under Trade. This
results in a decrease of 1.79, 1.83 and 1.93 percentage points in the aggregate saving
rate for λ = 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0, respectively. This confirms the finding above that the
change in income shares among entrepreneurs is behind the large increase in the
supply of capital. The value of λ affects the magnitude of the increase in the supply
of capital, by changing the slope of the saving-income relationship.
Overall, Table 2.5 shows that the degree of risk aversion matters for our eval-
uation of the realized gains from trade, through its effects on capital accumulation.
A larger value of λ corresponds to a larger increase in the capital stock and a
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greater increase in output, but at the cost of greater welfare loss for entrepreneurs.
The intuition is that a higher λ implies a steeper saving-income relationship for
entrepreneurs.
2.4 The Role of Capital
Section 2.3 demonstrates the implications of entrepreneurial income inequality
for gains from trade by contrasting the full model with the CM benchmark. The
mechanism linking entrepreneurial income inequality and gains from trade is capital
accumulation. In this section, I further investigate this point by repeating the
quantitative exercise in two models without capital.
I modify the full model by assuming labor is the only factor of production. I
refer to the resulting model as the “NoK” model. Similarly, I modify the CM bench-
mark and I refer to the resulting model as the “NoK CM” model. I then compare the
gains from trade under these two modified models. In the absence of capital, hetero-
geneity in entrepreneurial income affects the size of welfare gains for entrepreneurs,
but it does not affect the size of output gains or welfare gains for workers. Therefore,
the interaction of capital and the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial income explains
the sizable differences between the full model and the CM benchmark reported in
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.
The NoK model differs from the full model in the following ways. First, labor
is the only factor of production. An entrepreneur with productivity z(i) can produce
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a variety i of differentiated goods according to
q(i) = z(i)l, (2.15)
where l is variable labor input in production. Second, there are no financial interme-
diaries. Lastly, the final good is assumed to be non-perishable. In other words, there
is a technology that allows entrepreneurs to transform a unit of the final good today
into a future unit of the final good. Entrepreneurs can hold a non-negative amount
of the final good as savings (a ≥ 0). As a result, in the stationary equilibrium of
the NoK model, entrepreneurs hold a buffer-stock of the final good. Other features
of the NoK model are similar to the full model.
To construct the NoK CM model, I introduce a representative entrepreneur in
each country into the NoK model. The representative entrepreneur in each country
receives the profit of all the firms, while allowing each firm to make decisions inde-
pendently to maximize profit. The NoK CM model is entirely static and resembles
Chaney (2008).
2.4.1 The NoK Model
An entrepreneur produces a variety i of differentiated goods according to q(i) =
z(i)l. The dynamic budget constraint of an entrepreneur is given by
c+ a′ = max{πD(z), πX(z)}+ a.
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σ − w · (l + fX)
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s.t qD + τqX = zl
where qD and qX are total domestic sales and total export sales respectively.
A stationary competitive equilibrium with international trade is defined as an
invariant distribution G(.) of entrepreneurs over the (a, z) space, a set of prices, and
a set of policy functions such that:
1. Given aggregate variables w, P , E, and the corresponding variables in the
foreign country, the policy functions c(a, z), a′(a, z), e(z), l(z), qD(z) and
qX(z), solve an entrepreneur’s optimization problem.
2. The markets for labor and the final good clear. Trade balances.




























c(a, z)G(da, dz) + w = Y
3. The joint distribution of wealth a and entrepreneur productivity z is a fixed
point of the equilibrium mapping










for all (a, z).
2.4.2 The NoK CM Model
There is one representative entrepreneur in each country. The representative
entrepreneur owns all firms in the country. Other features of the NoK CM model







where u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0, subject to the dynamic budget constraint
ct + at+1 =
∫
max{πD(z), πX(z)}µ(dz) + at (2.17)
where πD(z) and πX(z) are the profit functions of a domestic firm and an exporting
firm respectively.
I use the same strategy as in Section 2.2 to calibrate both the NoK model and
the NoK CM model. Table 2.6 provides the details. The number of parameters is
reduced to six in the NoK model. The parameter values are identical to those in
Table 2.1, except for the fixed cost of exporting fX , which is set to 0.060. The NoK
CM model has only four parameters and the parameter values are the same as those
used for the NoK model.
Results
Table 2.7 reports the results from the NoK and NoK CM models. For ease of
comparison, Columns (3) and (4) reproduce the results from the full model and the
CM model, respectively.
Since the NoK CM model is similar to the class of models studied in Arkolakis
et al. (2012), it is interesting to compare the results. Arkolakis et al. (2012) show







Table 2.6: Calibration of Models without Capital
Panel A: Parameters Taken from Prior Literature
NoK Model NoK CM Model
Parameter Symbol Value Value
Coefficient of Risk Aversion λ 1.500 -
Elasticity of Substitution σ 5.000 5.000
Persistence of Firm Productivity γ 0.814 -
Shape Parameter of Firm Sales Distribution ζ 1.500 1.500
Panel B: Parameters Calibrated to Match Data Moments
NoK Model NoK CM Model
Target Moment US Data Parameter Model Parameter Model
Import Penetration Ratio 7.0% fEX = 0.060 7.0% fEX = 0.060 7.0%
Export to Sales Ratio 14.0% τ = 1.57 14.0% τ = 1.57 14.0%
The “NoK” Model refers to a modification of the full model which does not include capital in the
production function. The “NoK CM” Model refers to a version of the model with complete markets
where there is no capital.
where λii is the share of expenditure on the domestic good and ε < 0 is the elasticity
of trade flows with respect to the variable trade cost. As derived in Chaney (2008),
the elasticity of trade with respect to the variable trade cost in this model is given
by −η = −(σ− 1)ζ. I have set η = (σ− 1)ζ = 6.0 and λii = 0.93 in the calibration.
The formula in Equation (2.18) yields an output gain from trade of 1.2%. This is
the same as the output gain of 1.2% shown in Column (2).
To see the role of capital in models without heterogeneity in entrepreneurial
income, I compare Column (2) and Column (4) of Table 2.7. Although the aggregate
TFP gains are the same in the CM benchmark and the NoK CM benchmark, capital
accumulation in the CM model amplifies the output gains. As a result, the output
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Table 2.7: Gains From Trade in Models without Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model NoK NoK CM Full CM
TFP 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
Capital - - 3.9% 1.8%
Output 1.2% 1.2% 2.5% 1.8%
Consumption of Workers
Wage 1.8% 1.8% 3.4% 2.7%
Entrepreneurial Consumption
Aggregate -1.3% -1.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Certainty-Equivalent -4.6% - -4.0% -
The “NoK” Model refers to a modification of the full model which does not
include capital in the production function. The “NoK CM” Model refers to
a version of the model with complete markets where there is no capital. The
“Gains from Trade” numbers are the percentage differences in the relevant
measure between “Autarky” and “Trade,” where “Autarky” refers to the econ-
omy in stationary equilibrium when variable cost of trade is set to infinity and
“Trade” refers to the economy in stationary equilibrium.
gains, wage gains for workers, and aggregate entrepreneurial consumption gains are
all lower in the NoK CM benchmark than the corresponding numbers in the CM
benchmark.
Table 2.8 summarizes the effects of trade on income inequality among en-
trepreneurs in the NoK model. The results are similar to those from the full model.
Importantly, trade increases income inequality among entrepreneurs. To see the
effects of entrepreneurial income inequality in models without capital, I compare
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Table 2.8: Income Inequality in a Model without Capital (NoK)
Panel A. Inequality within the Entrepreneur Sector
Share of total entrepreneurial income
Autarky Trade
Top 1% 20.2% 22.1%
Top 2-5% 16.6% 17.4%
Top 5-20% 21.7% 20.9%
Top 20-50% 20.9% 19.9%
Bottom 50% 20.6% 19.7%
Gini Coefficient 0.498 0.521
Panel B. Inequality between Entrepreneurs and Workers
Autarky Trade
Workers Share of Total 80.0% 80.5%
“Autarky” refers to the economy in stationary equilibrium when vari-
able cost of trade is set to infinity; “Trade” refers to the economy in
stationary equilibrium calibrated to the observed level of trade in the
US
Column (1) and Column (2) of Table 2.7. The numbers in Column (1) and Column
(2) are identical. In summary, in the absence of capital accumulation, heterogeneity
in entrepreneur income affects our assessment of welfare gains for entrepreneurs, but
does not affect the size of output gains or welfare gains for workers. The interaction
of capital and the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial income contributes to the sizable
differences between Column (3) and Column (4).
2.5 Models with Occupational Choice
In the full model, I assume no entry or exit into entrepreneurship. This al-
lows me to examine the welfare implications of international trade for workers and
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entrepreneurs separately. In particular, the setup enables me to isolate the welfare
implications of top income inequality for workers. On the other hand, the exit of the
least productive firms resulting from greater trade openness is another important
source of TFP gains in the standard Melitz (2003) model. In this section, I describe
a version of the model with occupational choice as well as its associated complete
markets benchmark.
The Occupation Model
There are two symmetric countries. In each country, there is a unit measure of
infinitely-lived individuals, who are heterogeneous in their wealth a. Each individual
is endowed with one unit of productive labor, which is differentiated by the quality










In each period, individuals choose to work for a wage w, or work as a producer
of differentiated goods. Individuals have to pay a fixed cost fD, in terms of labor,
to operate a firm each period. An individual with an entrepreneurial idea of quality
z(i) can produce a variety i of differentiated goods according to
q(i) = z(i)kαl1−α. (2.20)
The quality of an entrepreneurial idea z is drawn from a time-invariant cumulative
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distribution function (CDF) µ(z). Entrepreneurial ideas expire with a probability
of (1 − γ) in each period. In the case of expiration of ideas, a new value of z is
drawn from the CDF µ(z). I denote an individual’s occupational choice as o ∈
{W,D,X}, where W , D and X correspond to workers, domestic producers and
exporters, respectively. The specification of the final good market, the differentiated
goods market, international trade, and the capital rental market are the same as in
the full model.
A stationary competitive equilibrium with international trade is similar to the
definition in Section 2.1.9, with the key modifications described below.
1. Given aggregate variables w, R, r, P , E, and the corresponding variables in the
foreign country, individual policy functions, c(a, z), a′(a, z), o(z), l(z), k(z),
qD(z) and qX(z), solve an individual’s optimization problem. The additional
policy function o(z) ∈ {W,D,X} is the occupational choice function of an
individual, which is characterized by
max{w, πD(z), πX(z)}.





















G(da, dz) · fX
The integral on the left hand side is taken over all workers {(a, z)| o(z) = W},
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and gives the total labor supply. The first integral on the right-hand side
is taken with respect to the entire population while the next two integrals
gives total labor used as fixed costs of operation and fixed costs of exporting,
respectively. Note that l(z) = 0 if o(z) = W , since workers have zero demand
for labor.





c(a, z)G(da, dz) + δ ·K = Y
The first integral on the left-hand side is taken with respect to the whole
population. This term is the total consumption in the economy. The other
terms on the left-hand side give the total depreciation of capital, the total fixed
cost of operation and the total fixed cost of exporting, respectively. Finally,
Y is the total output of the final good.
4. The joint distribution of wealth a and entrepreneurial ideas z is a fixed point
of the equilibrium mapping










For any point (a, z), the CDF at this point (LHS) should be equal to the CDF
at the same point next period (RHS).
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The Occupation CM Model
There is one representative agent in each country. The representative agent
of a country owns a unit measure of productive labor. As in the benchmark model,
productive labor is differentiated by the quality of the entrepreneurial idea z, which










subject to the dynamic budget constraint
ct + at+1 =
∫
max{w, πD(z), πX(z)}dµ(z) + (1 + r)at. (2.22)
The final good sector, the differentiated goods sector and the capital rental
market are the same as before. Each unit of productive labor makes production
decisions independently to maximize income. A stationary competitive equilibrium
with international trade is defined accordingly.
I calibrate the Occupation and the Occupation CM models following a strategy
similar to that in Section 2.2. The additional parameter to be calibrated is fD,
the fixed cost of operating a firm. I target this parameter to match the share of
entrepreneurs in the population. According to the 2004 data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the total number of firms with payroll in the US is 5.9 million
while total non-farm payroll employment is 132 million. I take the ratio of these
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two numbers (4.5%) as the targeted share of entrepreneurs in the population. Table
2.9 provides the details on the calibration of other parameters.
Table 2.9: Calibration of Models with Occupational Choice
Panel A: Parameters Taken from Prior Literature
“Occupation” “Occupation CM”
Parameter Symbol Value Value
Coefficient of Risk Aversion λ 1.500 -
Share of Capital in Production α 0.333 0.333
Capital Depreciation Rate δ 0.060 0.060
Elasticity of Substitution σ 5.000 5.000
Persistence of Firm Productivity γ 0.814 -
Shape Parameter of Sales Distribution ζ 1.500 1.500
Panel B: Parameters Calibrated to Match Data Moments
“Occupation” “Occupation CM”
Target Moment US Data Parameter Model Parameter Model
Interest Rate 3.0% β = 0.952 3.0% β = 0.971 3.0%
Export/GDP Ratio 7.0% fEX = 1.700 7.0% fEX = 1.700 7.0%
Export to Sales Ratio 14.0% τ = 1.57 14.0% τ = 1.57 14.0%
Percentage of Entrepreneurs in Population 4.5% fD = 1.250 4.5% fD = 1.250 4.5%
“Occupation” refers to a model with occupational choice while “Occupation CM” refers to
its associated complete markets benchmark.
Table 2.10 summarizes the gains from trade from both the Occupation and
Occupation CM models. Moving from Autarky to Trade, the TFP increase in the
Occupation model (1.2%) is slightly larger than in the Occupation CM model (1.0%).
In the Occupation model, the change in the equilibrium interest rate affects the
occupational choice of individuals by affecting the cost of capital and the profitability
of operating a firm. As in Section 2.3.3, the increase in capital stock is much larger
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Table 2.10: Gains from Trade in Models with Occupational Choice
“Occupation” “Occupation CM”




The Effect of Trade on Consumption and Welfare
Wage 2.5% 1.4%
Welfare 1.8% 1.4%
Workers Consumption 2.7% -
Entrepreneurial Consumption -1.8% -
The “Gains from Trade” numbers are the percentage differences in the
relevant measure between “Autarky” and “Trade”, where “Autarky”
refers to the economy in stationary equilibrium when the variable cost
of trade is set to infinity and “Trade” refers to the economy in station-
ary equilibrium calibrated to the observed level of trade in the US.
in the Occupation model (3.9%) than in the Occupation CM model (1.5%). The
difference in capital accumulation again contributes to differences in gains from trade
in terms of output, wages and welfare, where the welfare measure is the certainty-
equivalent consumption of a randomly-chosen individual in the economy. Lastly,
moving from Autarky to Trade in the Occupation model, the total consumption by
workers each period increases by 2.7% while the total consumption by entrepreneurs
decreases by 1.8%. I do not provide these numbers for the Occupation CM model
because incomes from all units of productive labor are pooled together in that model.
Therefore, the results in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 in Section 2.3 are robust
to the introduction of occupational choice into the model, although it is no longer
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possible to examine the welfare of workers and entrepreneurs separately.
2.6 Robustness and Extensions
In this section, I examine the robustness of the baseline results to alternative
modeling choices. In the first robustness check, I introduce a sunk cost of exporting.
In the second, I relax the borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs by introducing
a natural borrowing limit. In the third robustness check, I introduce a limited-
enforcement financial constraint on the production side, such that the production
policy functions include wealth a as an additional argument. The baseline results
are robust to these alternatives.
2.6.1 Sunk Cost
I first examine an alternative assumption on the fixed cost of exporting. In
addition to the per-period fixed cost of exporting fX , I assume that firms which did
not export the previous period have to pay a sunk cost of exporting of fsunk units of
labor. As a result, the previous export status of the firm is a state variable. Table
2.11 provides the details of the calibration. For simplicity, I set fsunk = 4 · fX in
the calibration. The results are reported in Column (1) in Table 2.12. The results
can be compared to Columns (4) and (5), which reproduce results from the full
model and from the CM benchmark, respectively. A comparison of Columns (1)
and (4) indicates that the quantitative results are broadly robust to the alternative
specification of the fixed cost of exporting.
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Table 2.11: Calibration: Extensions and Robustness
Panel A: Parameters Taken from Prior Literature
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
Model Sunk NBL K-Friction Full CM
Parameter Symbol Value Value Value Value Value
Coefficient of Risk Aversion λ 1.500 1.500 1.500 1.500 1.500
Share of Capital in Production α 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333
Capital Depreciation Rate δ 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
Elasticity of Substitution σ 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000
Persistence of Firm Productivity γ 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814
Shape Parameter of Sales Distribution ζ 1.500 1.500 1.500 1.500 1.500
Panel B: Parameter Calibrated to the Model
Sunk NBL K-Friction Full Model CM
Target Moment Data Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
Interest Rate 3.0% β = 0.952 β = 0.892 β = 0.952a β = 0.952 β = 0.971
Import Penetration Ratio 7.0% fEX = 0.051 fEX = 0.091 fEX = 0.058 fEX = 0.09 fEX = 0.09
fsunk = 0.204 - - - -
Export to Sales Ratio 14.0% τ = 1.57 τ = 1.57 τ = 1.57 τ = 1.57 τ = 1.57
Credit/GDP Ratio (Counter-factual) 60.00% - - φ = 0.23 - -
a β is taken from the full model. It is not re-calibrated to match the interest rate.
“Sunk” refers to a modification of the full model with sunk cost of exporting. “NBL” refers to a version of the
model where there is a “Natural Borrowing Limit”. “K-Frictions” refers to a version of the model with financial
frictions on the production side.
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Table 2.12: Robustness of Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Sunk NBL K-Frictions Full Model CM
TFP 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 1.2% 1.2%
Capital 4.1% 3.4% 2.4% 3.9% 1.8%
Output 2.6% 2.3% 1.7% 2.5% 1.8%
Consumption of Workers
Wage 3.5% 3.3% 3.0% 3.4% 2.7%
Entrepreneurial Consumption
Aggregate 0.2% 0.0% -1.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Certainty-Equivalent -4.0% -2.8% -2.8% -4.0% -
“Sunk” refers to a modification of the full model with a sunk cost of exporting.
“NBL” refers to a version of the model with a “Natural Borrowing Limit”. “K-
Frictions” refers to a version of the model with financial frictions on the production
side. Columns (4) and (5) reproduce key results from Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
2.6.2 Natural Borrowing Limits
I have assumed so far that entrepreneurs cannot borrow (a ≥ 0). To examine
the role of the zero-borrowing assumption, I study a version of the model with a





Inequality (2.23) requires an entrepreneur to be able to keep up with the interest pay-
ment on her loans while maintaining positive consumption, even if the entrepreneur
receives the lowest possible productivity zmin forever. Table 2.11 provides the details
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of the calibration. As reported in Column (2) of Table 2.12, while the specification
of a natural borrowing limit reduces the contribution of capital accumulation to
output gains from trade, there is still a large increase of the capital stock of 3.4%
when moving from Autarky to Trade.
2.6.3 Financial Frictions for Production
In this alternative, I assume that capital rental by firms is limited by imperfect
enforceability of contracts. Entrepreneurs can default on their contracts after pro-
duction has taken place. In case of default, entrepreneurs can keep a fraction (1−φ)
of capital and revenue net of labor costs and export fixed costs, but they lose their
financial assets deposited with the financial intermediary. In the following period,
entrepreneurs regain access to financial markets despite the history of default. The
parameter φ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, indexes financial development of an economy.



















where qD(z) = zkαl1−α. Equation (2.24) states that a non-exporter must end up
with more resources by fulfilling credit and rental obligations (left-hand side) than














R + (1− φ)(1− δ)
]
+ (1 + r)a ≥ 0, (2.25)
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which implies a capital rental limit k̄X(a, z;φ) for exporters. Entrepreneurs hire
capital subject to Equations (2.25) and Equation (2.26), and there is no default in
equilibrium.
The other features of the model are the same as the full model. With the finan-
cial constraints, the production policy functions are now written as qD(a, z), qX(a, z),
k(a, z), l(a, z) and e(a, z). The stationary equilibrium is defined anagolously. The
full model in this paper corresponds to the special case where φ = 1.
I calibrate the additional parameter φ to match the total private credit to
GDP ratio. In the calibration of the full model (φ = 1), the credit to GDP ratio
is 189%, compared to the figure of 162% for the US in 2000. Keeping the other
parameters constant, I calibrate the financial development parameter φ to match
a Credit/GDP ratio of 60%, which is the level of financial development studied in
Buera and Shin (2013), and change the fixed cost of exporting fX to maintain an
import penetration ratio of 7%. The introduction of the enforcement constraint
decreases the demand for capital and the equilibrium interest rate. I do not change
β to maintain r = 3.00%. The strategy of calibrating φ after calibrating other
parameters to the US benchmark follows Buera and Shin (2013). Lastly, I increase
the variable cost τ to infinity to obtain the equilibrium under Autarky. The details
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of the calibration are presented in Column (3) of Table 2.11 while the results are
presented in Table 2.12. Moving from Autarky to Trade, TFP increases by 0.9%,
smaller than the increase of 1.2% in the full model. The capital stock increases
by 2.4%, which is larger than the increase in the CM benchmark, when we take
into account the smaller increase in TFP in the K-Frictions model. Therefore,
the mechanism emphasized in this study is robust to the introduction of financial
frictions on the production side.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I construct a dynamic model of international trade with in-
complete markets. I propose a mechanism through which accounting for the effects
of international trade on top income inequality implies higher gains from trade for
workers. I show that the proposed mechanism is quantitatively important by con-
trasting the full model with alternative models without top income inequality or
without capital. Additionally, the baseline calibration results are robust to various
model extensions. I examine the empirical relevance of the theory in the next two
chapters.
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Chapter 3: Cross-Country Evidence
3.1 Overview
The theoretical model in the previous chapter provides a number of testable
hypotheses. The model predicts an increase in labor productivity resulting from re-
allocation of market shares across firms. This is confirmed by empirical studies such
as Frankel and Romer (1999), Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), Pavcnik (2002) and Tre-
fler (2004). Additionally, the model predicts that reduced barriers to international
trade increase inequality within the top of the income distribution. Despite recent
efforts to construct top income shares for a number of countries (Piketty and Saez,
2003), the sample of countries with top income data remains too small for analysis
using panel regressions.1 Testing the relationship between top income inequality
and trade openness using micro data on trade liberalization episodes is hindered by
poor coverage of high-income households in typical household survey data.
The model also predicts a strong relationship between the individual-level
1The World Top Income Database by Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) covers 25
countries. I attempt to use the top income database to analyze the effects of trade openness on
top income inequality in a panel of countries. I find that the results are sensitive to exclusion
of certain countries (for example, Singapore). Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom (2009) study
the correlates of top income inequality using a sample of 14 countries and do not find a positive
correlation between trade openness and top income shares. However, they do not attempt to
establish causality.
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saving rate and income among entrepreneurs (the top of the income distribution of
the whole population). According to Dynan et al. (2004), the median saving rate
is 51.2% for households in the top 1% of income, and 37.2% for the households
in the top 5% of income (inclusive of the top 1%) in the 1983-89 US Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) data.2 If the saving rate is a function of a household’s
position in the income distribution, as in my model (Figure 2.1), a shift of income
shares towards the individuals at the top of the income distribution can increase the
aggregate saving rate substantially.
In view of the evidence on the saving-income relationship, if openness increases
top income inequality, there should be a positive relationship between the aggregate
saving rate and openness. I test this hypothesis using data in a large number of
countries. An important advantage of this approach is that data on the aggregate
saving rate is more widely available than data on top income shares. To begin, I
study the relationship between aggregate saving and trade openness in a cross sec-
tion of countries using the IV approach pioneered by Frankel and Romer (1999). I
find that trade openness has a large positive effect on the aggregate saving rate in a
cross section of countries. I then use fixed-effects regressions to study the relation-
ship between openness and the saving rate in a panel of countries. To distinguish the
supply-side channel from the demand-side channel, I also examine the relationship
between the aggregate investment rate and trade openness. If the saving-openness
relationship is driven primarily by higher returns to investment, we would expect
2On a related note, using tax returns data, Saez and Zucman (2014) calculate that the average
saving rate is 36% for the top 1% in wealth and 22% for the top 10% in wealth over the period
1986-2012 for the US.
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the investment-openness relationship to be stronger than the saving-openness rela-
tionship, since at least some of the increased investment following an increase in
openness would be financed by capital inflows. Finally, I extend the gravity-based
IV approach pioneered by Frankel and Romer (1999) to a panel setting, and find
larger effects of trade openness on the saving rate than in the simple fixed-effects
regressions.
3.2 Empirical Evidence in a Cross Section of Countries
The baseline cross-sectional regression is
Si = β0 + β1(Trade/GDP)i + β2Institutioni + β3Xi + ui (3.1)
where Si is the gross national saving rate for country i, (Trade/GDP)i is the
Trade/GDP ratio, Institutioni is a measure of institutional quality, and Xi is a
vector of control variables, respectively. The proxy of institutional quality, adapted
by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999),
is designed to measure government effectiveness, rule of law and graft. Following
Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), I control for the log of population and the log of total
land area to capture any scale effects. Lastly, I include continent dummies in all
regressions.
The conventional openness ratio (the Trade/GDP ratio) is defined as the sum
of exports and imports over GDP, where each term is calculated based on the nom-
inal exchange rate. Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) argue that the real openness ratio,
65
defined as the sum of real exports and real imports over purchasing power parity
(PPP) GDP, is theoretically preferred to the conventional measure. According to
the model in Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), greater trade openness can reduce the price
level in the tradable sector relative to the price level in the non-tradable sector as a
result of a productivity increase in the tradable sector. This may cause a distortion
in the conventional openness ratio. While Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) do not adjust
the sum of exports and imports for PPP prices, presumably due to data availabil-
ity, the most recent Penn World Table (Mark 8.0) (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer,
2013) has made this adjustment possible. I use the real openness ratio from PWT
(Mark 8.0), which adjusts the sum of exports and imports for PPP prices, through-
out this chapter. I provide a summary of the main variables and data sources for
the empirical exercise in Appendix 3A.
Trade openness can be correlated with many variables, such as income level
and factor endowment. In a cross-section OLS regression with the aggregate saving
rate as the dependent variable, it is difficult to sufficiently control for all potential
variables. Additionally, reverse causality is also a concern. For example, a higher
saving rate may allow a country to develop its tradable sector and have a higher level
of openness. I employ the Frankel and Romer (1999) gravity approach to construct
an instrument for trade openness. In the first step, I run a gravity regression to
relate bilateral trade flows to variables capturing geography and population.3 For
each country, I aggregate the predicted values of this gravity equation across all
3Specifically, the geography terms in the estimated gravity equation include bilateral distance,
total land area, landlocked status and bordering status. Bordering status is interacted with all
other geographic features and population. This follows Frankel and Romer (1999) exactly.
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trade partners. The resulting variable is used as an instrument for trade openness.
I instrument for institutional quality using the population share speaking one
of five primary European languages since birth and distance from equator, following
Hall and Jones (1999) and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). Hall and Jones (1999) argue
that these two variables capture the historical influence of European countries on
institutional quality. I focus on data from 1985 to facilitate comparison with Frankel
and Romer (1999) and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), both of which use data from 1985.
My main measure of national saving is the gross national saving rate from
the World Development Index (WDI), which is defined as national income plus net
transfers less consumption, as a percentage of gross national income. Figure 3.1
plots the gross national saving rate against the Trade/GDP ratio in 1985 for the 99
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countries for which I have data on all variables in Equation (3.1).4 Figure 3.1 shows
a strong and positive correlation between the gross national saving rate and trade
openness.
Table 3.1: First Stages of 2SLS Cross-sectional Regressions
(1) (2)
Trade/GDP Institution
Predicted Trade Share 0.595*** 0.00883*
(0.143) (0.00444)
European Languages 6.968 0.837***
(8.870) (0.257)
Distance to Equator 0.184 0.0276***
(0.203) (0.00638)
Log Population -5.495* 0.0455
(3.267) (0.0530)
Log Area 2.495 0.00878
(2.665) (0.0553)
Excluded IV F-stat 9.813 15.96
R2 0.494 0.726
N 84 84
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The data are from
1985. The variable “Predicted Trade Share” is constructed using popula-
tion and geography as determinants of bilateral trade flows in the gravity
equation. We then aggregate the predicted values for each country. The
variable “Europrean Languages” refers to the population share speaking
one of five primary European languages since birth.
I exclude small countries with a population of less than 1.5 million in the
4Singapore and Bahamas appear to be outliers in terms of openness and are excluded from
Figure 3.1 and the regression analysis. Inclusion of these two countries would strengthen the
results.
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regression analysis. The resulting sample includes 84 countries. The first-stage re-
gressions are presented in Table 3.1. The Stock-Yogo test for weak instruments sug-
gests that the instruments are weak.5 To alleviate weak-instrument-bias concerns,
I re-estimate all specifications using the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood
(LIML) Estimator. The results from LIML are very similar to the 2SLS estimates.6
The OLS results are reported in Column (1) of Table 3.2. Consistent with
Figure 3.1, the national saving rate is positively correlated with trade openness at
5% significance level. The results from the 2SLS regressions for saving are presented
in Column (2) of Table 3.2. The specification follows the baseline in Alcalá and
Ciccone (2004) closely.7 According to the point estimate, a one-percentage-point
increase in the Trade/GDP ratio raises the national saving rate by 0.209 percentage
point. Interestingly, the point estimate is close to the value of 0.221 from the fixed-
effects panel IV regression presented below (Section 3.3.3). However, the coefficient
on the Trade/GDP ratio is statistically significant at 10%. Institutional quality does
not appear to have a significant effect on the aggregate saving rate.
In Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3.2, I repeat the regression with the investment
rate as the dependent variable. If the saving-openness relationship is driven pri-
marily by a higher return to investment, we would expect the investment-openness
relationship to be stronger than the saving-openness relationship, since at least some
5With two endogenous variables, the usual rule-of-thumb F-Statistic of 10 does not apply. The
Stock-Yogo test does not reject the null that the quality of the instruments is of the lowest level.
6The Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator is more robust in over-
identified models. It is less efficient but also less biased than 2SLS (Angrist and Pischke, 2008,
p.213).
7In Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), the dependent variable of interest is log output per worker.
Since they are interested in estimating the elasticity of productivity with respect to openness, they
use the log of real openness (instead of its level).
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of the investment would be financed by capital inflows. I use gross fixed capital for-
mation as a percentage of GDP, available from the WDI database, as the investment
measure. I do not find a positive effect of trade openness on the investment rate in
the 2SLS results in Column (5) which is my preferred specification. I interpret the
results as supportive of the supply-side channel of capital accumulation.
To provide a comparison to the trade-growth literature, Columns (7)-(9) of
Table 3.2 repeat the regressions with log of GDP per capita as the dependent vari-
able. In the 2SLS results in Column (8), the coefficient on the Trade/GDP ratio is
0.0148, with a P-value of 0.128. A one-percentage-point increase in the Trade/GDP
ratio raises GDP per capita by 1.48%. The log of GDP per capita increases by
0.279 standard deviation, compared to an increase of 0.677 standard deviation for
the gross national saving rate, if the openness measure increases by one standard
deviation. Therefore, the estimated effect of trade openness on the aggregate saving
rate is large. According to my model, a higher aggregate saving rate (Column (2)
of Table 3.2) contributes substantially to higher income (Column (8) of Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2: The Effects of Trade on Aggregate Saving and Investment
Cross-sectional Regressions with IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Saving Investment Income
OLS 2SLS LIML OLS 2SLS LIML OLS 2SLS LIML
Trade/GDP 0.0904** 0.209* 0.210* 0.0106 -0.132 -0.143 0.0142*** 0.0148 0.0148
(0.0391) (0.120) (0.122) (0.0627) (0.127) (0.134) (0.00476) (0.00972) (0.00974)
Institutional Quality 0.553 -0.938 -0.971 2.262* 5.789* 6.027* 0.656*** 0.805*** 0.805***
(1.348) (2.561) (2.594) (1.336) (3.192) (3.353) (0.152) (0.239) (0.240)
R2 0.368 0.286 0.284 0.320 0.157 0.133 0.787 0.782 0.782
N 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
The dependent variables are the gross national saving rate (Columns (1)-(3)), the gross investment rate (Columns (4)-(6)) and log of GDP per capita
(Columns (7)-(9)), respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. The data are from 1985. I instrument for the Trade/GDP ratio and institutional quality. The instruments used are predicted trade shares
(Frankel and Romer, 1999), the population share speaking one of five primary European languages since birth, and distance from the equator. All regressions
include log population, log total land area, and continental dummies as right-hand side variables.
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Table 3.3: Robustness Checks on Cross-sectional Regression with IV
(1) (2) (3)
D-graph No-Oil 10-Years
Panel A. Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.180* 0.190* 0.281**
(0.0984) (0.114) (0.126)
Institutional Quality -3.454 -1.136 -2.278
(3.792) (2.527) (2.823)
Panel B. Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP -0.134 -0.121 0.0588
(0.118) (0.128) (0.112)
Institutional Quality 6.285 5.814* 2.245
(4.548) (3.305) (2.902)
N 84 81 84
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The basic specifi-
cation follows Column (1) of Table 3.2. Column (1) controls for young and
old age dependency ratios; Column (2) excludes major oil exporters in the
sample; Column (3) uses data averaged over 1981-1990.
I subject the baseline cross-sectional IV regressions to a number of robustness
checks. Results are shown in Table 3.3. The results are robust to controlling for
age dependency ratios and exclusion of the major oil exporters from the sample. To
address the concern that the results might be driven by data anomalies from one
particular year, I show that the results are similar if I use the 1981-1990 averages of
variables.
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3.3 Empirical Evidence in a Panel of Countries
3.3.1 Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions
This section analyzes the effects of trade openness on the national saving rate
in a panel of countries. The equation of interest is
Sit = β0 + β1(Trade/GDP)it + β2Xit + ci + µt + vit (3.2)
where Sit is the national saving rate in country i at time t, (Trade/GDP)it is the
Trade/GDP ratio (the openness ratio), Xit is a vector of control variables, and ci
and µt are country and time fixed effects, respectively.
I continue to use the gross national saving rate from the World Development
Index (WDI) as the main measure of national saving. To distinguish the supply-
side channel of capital from the demand-side channel in the data, I also examine a
specification analogous to Equation (3.2) but with the gross investment rate as the
dependent variable.
To reduce the influence of outliers, I group the years 1961-2005 into nine non-
overlapping five-year intervals and use the averages of yearly data in the regressions.
I exclude the years after 2005 in view of the global recession starting in 2007. I
exclude countries whose population in 1961 is smaller than 1.5 million, because the
aggregate variables of small states are more prone to large fluctuations.8 The final
8Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) argue that the determination of real income in small coun-
tries may be dominated by idiosyncratic factors, and they exclude small countries from one of their
samples in their test of the Solow growth model. The population cutoff of 1.5 million for small
states in this chapter is taken from the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
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sample includes 111 countries.
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the results from fixed-effects panel regressions
on the saving rate. Column (1) includes the Trade/GDP ratio as the only right-
hand-side variable aside from the fixed effects. A one-percentage-point increase in
the Trade/GDP ratio is associated with a 0.0744 percentage point increase in the
aggregate saving rate. The coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%
significance level. In Column (2), I control for income by including the log of GDP
per capita and its square. Since GDP per capita is most likely endogenous with
respect to the saving rate, I lag these two variables by five years. The coefficient
on trade openness remains positive and significant. In Table 3.5, I show that the
results are robust to controlling for current income instead of lagged income.
Financial development is another potentially important omitted variable. In
Column (3), I control for financial development using the Credit/GDP ratio. I lag
the Credit/GDP ratio by five years since this measure is potentially endogenous with
respect to the saving rate. Column (3) is my preferred panel specification. Accord-
ing to Column (3), a one-percentage-point increase in the Trade/GDP ratio raises
the aggregate saving rate by 0.107 percentage point. The coefficient is statistically
significant at 1%. According to the point estimate in Column (3), the gross national
saving rate increases by 0.255 standard deviation for a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in the openness measure.9 As an example, if Bulgaria (Trade/GDP ratio at
33.0%) had the same level of openness as Austria (Trade/GDP ratio at 81.3%) over
smallstates/overview).
9I remove the country and year fixed-effects before calculating the standard deviations of the
Trade/GDP ratio and the gross national saving rate.
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Table 3.4: The Effect of Trade on Aggregate Saving and Investment
Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No-Covar Lag-Y Fin-Dev Lag-Lead Inv/Sav
Panel A. Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0744*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.0907** 0.0773*







Within R2 0.0930 0.165 0.166 0.201 0.358
Panel B. Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0125 0.0463*** 0.0479*** 0.0572*** 0.00797







Within R2 0.0466 0.157 0.161 0.180 0.354
N Countries 111 111 111 107 111
N Observations 567 567 567 461 567
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. I group the years 1961-2005
into nine five-year intervals and use the averages of yearly data in the regressions. Time and country
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Column (1) (“No-Covar”) includes only time and country
fixed effects as controls; Column (2) (“Lag-Y”) adds log income and its square (both lagged) as
controls; Column (3) (“Fin-Dev”) additionally controls for the Credit/GDP ratio (lagged); Column
(4) controls for the five-year lag and lead of the Trade/GDP ratio, in addition to the controls in
Column (3); Column (5) (“Inv/Sav”) controls for the investment rate in the saving regression, and
for the saving rate in the investment regression, in addition to the controls in Column (3).
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the period 1996 to 2000, its predicted average national saving rate would have been
18.8% instead of 13.7%.
Columns (1)-(3) demonstrate a strong correlation between trade openness and
the saving rate. However, a higher level of openness may be a result rather than
a cause of a higher aggregate saving rate. For example, a positive shock to the
national saving rate may allow a country to build up infrastructure conducive to
international trade, resulting in a higher measured level of openness. To address
this issue, I include the five-year lag and lead of the Trade/GDP ratio in the panel
regression. As shown in Column (4) of Table 3.4, the coefficient on the contem-
poraneous Trade/GDP ratio remains positive and statistically significant. On the
other hand, the coefficients on past and future trade openness are not statistically
significant. This provides some evidence in favor of the proposed mechanism.
The theoretical model emphasizes the importance of the supply-side channel
of capital accumulation. However, the strong correlation between the Trade/GDP
ratio and the saving rate may be driven by demand-side factors, as a higher return to
investment after a trade liberalization induces households to save more. In Column
(5), I control for the gross investment rate in the regression. The results show
that, conditional on the gross investment rate, there is still a strong and positive
correlation between the Trade/GDP ratio and the national saving rate. This is not
what we would expect to find if the saving-openness relationship is solely driven by
a higher return to investment.
In Panel B of Table 3.4, I repeat the analysis with the gross investment rate
as the dependent variable. The coefficient on the Trade/GDP ratio is positive and
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statistically significant at 1% in Columns (2) and (3), but it is not statistically
significant in Column (1). According to Column (3), the gross investment rate
increases by 0.165 standard deviation following a one-standard-deviation increase
in the Trade/GDP ratio, compared to an increase of 0.255 standard deviation for
the national saving rate. Column (4) shows that the investment rate is positively
correlated with contemporaneous trade openness but is not correlated with past
or future trade openness. Column (5) shows that conditional on the saving rate,
there is no statistically significant relationship between trade openness and the gross
investment rate.
I find that the results in Table 3.4 are robust to the introduction of additional
regressors and modifications of the baseline specification. The details of the robust-
ness checks are presented in Table 3.5. One important concern with the baseline
results is that the coefficient on Trade/GDP is simply picking up the effects of capi-
tal account openness. In Column (1) of Table 3.5, I include the Quinn Index (Quinn
and Toyoda, 2008) as an additional regressor to control for capital account openness.
The sample of countries is reduced substantially by data availability. However, the
coefficient on trade openness remains positive and significant.10
In the baseline panel regression, I lag the income terms by five years, as the
current income level is clearly endogenous with respect to the saving rate in the
model. In Column (2), I use current income terms in place of lagged income terms,
despite the endogeneity concerns. In Column (3), I control for the GDP growth rate.
10Neither controlling for capital account openness nor changing the sample of countries have an
impact on baseline results.
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In Column (4), I include old and young dependency ratios as additional regressors to
capture the effects of demographic changes. Column (5) includes the inflation rate
as an additional regressor. The results in Table 3.5 are in line with those presented
in Table 3.4.
The national accounting identity implies that S − I = X −M , where S, I, X
and M are saving, investment, exports and imports, respectively. This may suggest
controlling for the trade balance. In Column (6) of Table 3.5, I include the trade
surplus as an additional regressor. The point estimate of the coefficient on the
Trade/GDP ratio decreases to 0.0664 but remains statistically significant at 1%.
Since I am holding (S− I) constant in this regression, the results in Column (6) are
consistent with the finding that a substantial part of the openness-induced saving
translates into higher investment.
Another concern is that the relationship between the gross national saving rate
and openness is working through public saving, while my model is about the private
saving rate. To alleviate this concern, Column (7) includes total government expen-
diture as a share of GDP. Additionally, Column (8) uses data on the private saving
rate from Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000) as the dependent variable.
Although the sample is substantially reduced, the coefficient on the Trade/GDP
ratio remains positive and statistically significant.
Another concern is that the results in Table 3.4 are driven by a handful of
countries. The World Bank classifies countries into seven regions: East Asia and
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and
North Africa, North America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. To address the
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concern of outlier countries, I drop each region one by one from the full sample
and repeat the analysis in each column of Table 3.6. The results are robust to the
exclusion of any single region. In each column of Table 3.6, I drop a different region
from the full sample and repeat the baseline panel regression. As shown in Table
3.6, the results are robust to the exclusion of any single region.
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Table 3.5: Robustness of Panel Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions:
Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
K-Open Current-Y Growth D-graph Inflation Balance Gov-Size P-saving L-Share
Panel A: Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0865** 0.0875** 0.0892** 0.105** 0.107*** 0.0825*** 0.102*** 0.0593* 0.0547**
(0.0337) (0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0406) (0.0391) (0.0283) (0.0361) (0.0310) (0.0262)
Panel B: Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0502*** 0.0344** 0.0375*** 0.0467*** 0.0472*** 0.0694*** 0.0488*** 0.00103
(0.0172) (0.0151) (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0148) (0.0191)
N Countries 73 111 111 111 111 111 111 61 83
N Observations 444 567 566 567 566 567 565 300 250
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. I group the years 1961-2005 into nine five-year intervals and use the averages of yearly data in the regressions. Time and country fixed effects
are included in all regressions. The standard set of control variables include log of income and its square (both lagged) and the Credit/GDP ratio (lagged).
Column (1) controls for capital account openness; Column (2) replaces the lagged income terms with current income terms; Column (3) controls for the GDP
growth rate; Column (4) controls for old and young dependency ratios; Column (5) controls for the inflation rate; Column (6) controls for the trade balance;
Column (7) controls for total government expenditure as a share of GDP; Column (8) uses the private saving rate as the dependent variable; Column (9)
controls for the labor share of income.
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Table 3.6: Robustness of Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions:
Exclusion of Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subsample None E. Asia Europe & L. America M. East N. America S. Asia S.S. Africa
Excluded & Pacific C. Asia & Caribbean & N. Africa
Panel A: Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.107*** 0.0865* 0.153*** 0.110** 0.0827** 0.107*** 0.101** 0.111**
(0.0392) (0.0501) (0.0330) (0.0437) (0.0323) (0.0397) (0.0385) (0.0445)
Panel B: Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0479*** 0.0604*** 0.0556** 0.0421** 0.0405*** 0.0496*** 0.0440*** 0.0433***
(0.0157) (0.0180) (0.0269) (0.0165) (0.0146) (0.0160) (0.0151) (0.0147)
N Countries 111 97 71 96 102 109 106 85
N Observations 567 495 405 471 519 551 535 426
Column (1) reproduces Column (3) of Table 3.4. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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3.3.2 The Role of Initial Top 10% Income Share
The fixed-effects regressions above establish a strong correlation between trade
openness and the aggregate saving rate. In the model, trade openness has a positive
effect on the aggregate saving through its effects on entrepreneurial saving. It is
interesting to examine how the saving-openness relationship is affected by the share
of total income received by entrepreneurs. If the increase in the aggregate saving
rate in Table 3.4 is driven by increased inequality among entrepreneurs (high-income
earners), greater trade openness should have a larger effect on the aggregate saving
rate in a country where entrepreneurs account for a greater share of total income.
The equation of interest is
Sit = β0 + β1(Trade/GDP)it + β2Top10%i · (Trade/GDP)it + β3Xit + ci + µt + vit,
(3.3)
where Top10%i is the share of total income received by entrepreneurs. As in Col-
umn (3) of Table 3.4, I control for lagged income and financial development. The
coefficient β1 shoud be interpreted jointly with the coefficient on the interaction β2.
The marginal effect on the aggregate saving rate of an increase in the Trade/GDP
ratio is given by (β1 + β2Top10%i).
I use data on top 10% income share from the UNU-WIDER World Income
Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER, 2014) as a proxy for the share of total income
received by entrepreneurs. Ideally, I would like to use data on top 10% income shares
from a single cross section in 1960 to capture the difference in initial inequality before
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any changes in trade openness. However, data availability for top 10% income shares
varies across years and countries. For the countries without data for 1960, I use data
closest to 1960. Since UNU-WIDER has data going back to 1867, the years with
data closest to 1960 may be before 1960, after 1960 or both.11 This procedure allows
me to retain the largest possible number of countries in the sample.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 3.7. Column (1) presents the
results when all countries with available data are included in the sample. The point
estimate of β2 is positive but statistically insignificant. A problem with the results
in Column (1) is the use of data from different years to proxy for the cross-sectional
difference in top income inequality between countries. In Column (2), I conduct the
same analysis for countries for which the data on top 10% income shares come from a
20-year window between 1951 and 1970. This reduces the number of countries in the
sample to 58. The point estimate of β2 is positive and statistically significant at 10%.
Figure 3.2 plots the marginal effects of a percentage point increase in the openness
ratio on the national saving rate, against the initial top 10% income share. Among
the countries in the sample, a one-percentage-point increase in the Trade/GDP ratio
effects the national saving rate by -0.002 to 0.177 percentage points, depending on
the level of inequality where the negative values are not statistically different from
zero. According to Column (2), a one-percentage-point increase in the initial top
10% income share increases the marginal effect on the national saving rate of a
one-percentage-point increase in the Trade/GDP ratio by 0.004 percentage points.
11As an example, data for a country may be available for 1958 and 1962 but not available for
1960. In this case, I take the average between the 1958 and 1962 data.
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Table 3.7: The Role of Initial Top 10% Income Share
The Effects of Openness on Saving and Investment
(1) (2) (3)
All 20-Year 10-Year
Panel A. Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0174 -0.0882 -0.128
(0.0909) (0.0909) (0.0874)
Initial Top 10% Share× Trade/GDP 0.00239 0.00447* 0.00574**
(0.00233) (0.00230) (0.00235)
Within R2 0.181 0.176 0.189
Panel B. Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0122 -0.00436 -0.00834
(0.0396) (0.0540) (0.0506)
Initial Top 10% Share× Trade/GDP 0.00135 0.00216 0.00215
(0.00111) (0.00139) (0.00136)
Within R2 0.185 0.227 0.259
N Countries 107 58 44
N Observations 551 364 281
Robust standard errors are clustered at country level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. I group the years 1961-2005 into non-overlapping
5-year intervals and use the averages of yearly data in the regressions. I control for log income and its
square (both lagged), and the Credit/GDP ratio (lagged). Time and country fixed effects are included
in all regressions. Column (1) (“All years”) includes all countries for which we have data; Column (2)
(“20-Years”) restricts the sample to countries for which the data on initial inequality (top 10% income
shares) come from 1951-1970; Column (3) (“10-Years”) restricts the sample to countries for which the
data on initial inequality (top 10% income shares) come from 1956-1965.
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Column (3) further limits the analysis to countries for which the data on top 10%
income shares come from a 10-year window between 1956 and 1965. The point
estimate for β2 increases slightly and is now statistically significant at 5%. The
results suggest that the share of total income received by entrepreneurs plays an
important role for the saving-openness relationship.
Panel B of Table 3.7 repeats the analysis with the gross investment rate as
the dependent variable. The coefficient on the interaction term between inequality
and trade openness is positive but is statistically insignificant in all three columns.
This is reminiscent of the results in Table 3.4 that the saving-openness relationship
is stronger than the investment-openness relationship.
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3.3.3 Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions with IV
A concern about the fixed-effects results presented above is that openness
might be endogenous with respect to saving. For example, a strong economy overall
could simultaneously boost saving and trade. Alternatively, an increase in domestic
saving could allow domestic firms to invest in export operations. To address issues
of endogeneity, I again follow Frankel and Romer (1999) and Alcalá and Ciccone
(2004) in using gravity variables as instruments for openness, as in the previous
cross-section analysis. Here, I extend the gravity-based methodology of Frankel and
Romer (1999) to a panel setting.12 To construct my instrument, I run the following




) = γ0 + γ1Freightτ · ln(Distij) + γ2Xij + γ3Zijτ + uτ + εijτ (3.4)
where Tradeijτ is the sum of exports and imports between country i and country
j, Freightτ is an index of shipping costs (common to all countries) from Hummels
(2007), ln(Distij) is the log of bilateral distance between the two countries, Xij
is a vector of geography variables (including ln(Distij)), Zijτ are the time-varying
gravity terms related to population, and uτ is a year fixed effect.
13 Specifically,
Xij includes bilateral distance, total land area, landlocked status, bordering status,
12Feyrer (2009) and Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013) use gravity-based IV in a panel setting to
study the relationship between income and trade openness. Feyrer (2009) exploits the fact that
improvement in aircraft technology increases bilateral trade more for country pairs with relatively
short air routes compared to sea routes. Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013) use natural disasters as a
source of exogenous variation.
13I experiment with a specification with bilateral fixed effects to control for all time-invariant
factors. I find that the 2SLS results from the resulting IV are very sensitive to exclusions of
particular subsamples.
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and the interaction of bordering status with all other geographic features; and Zijτ
includes population and its interaction with bordering status. These gravity terms
follow Frankel and Romer (1999) closely.
Table 3.8: Results from Estimating a Panel Gravity Equation
Log (Bilateral Trade /GDPi )
Log Distance -0.836***
(0.0154)
Freight Cost Index * Log Distance -0.0938***
(0.00970)
Log Population (Country i) -0.175***
(0.00358)
Log Population (Country j) 0.948***
(0.00349)
Log Population * Border Status (Country i) -0.189***
(0.0243)




Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively. The panel gravity equation also include total land area, landlocked status, bordering
status and its interaction with total land area and with landlocked status, and year dummies.
I estimate Equation (3.4) using fixed-effects panel regression.14 I then aggre-
gate the predicted bilateral trade shares (unlogged) from Equation (3.4) over trade
partners to obtain the predicted trade share for country i in year τ . The predicted
trade shares are then averaged over nine five-year intervals and employed as an IV
14I also experiment with the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (PPML) proposed
in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and find the resulting instrument to be too weak.
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Table 3.9: The Effect of Trade on Aggregate Saving and Investment
Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions with IV
FE-OLS FE-2SLS
Panel A. Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.110*** 0.221**
(0.0411) (0.0952)
Panel B. Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP 0.0546*** -0.0479
(0.0188) (0.0679)
Panel C. First Stage of 2SLS
Predicted Trade Share 1.879**
(0.743)
Excluded IV F-Stat 6.399
N Countries 83 83
N Observations 441 441
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively. I group the years 1961-2000 into eight five-year intervals
and use the averages of yearly data in the regressions. Time and country
fixed effects are included in all regressions. The control variables are log
income and its square (both lagged), the Credit/GDP ratio (lagged) and log
population. The instrument in 2SLS regressions is the predicted trade share
from a panel gravity regression (see text).
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for the Trade/GDP ratio in Equation (3.2).15 Aside from the year fixed effect in
Equation (3.4), the resulting predicted trade shares are time-varying for two reasons.
First, the gravity terms involving population are time varying. Second, advances
in shipping technology, as reflected in the decrease in the index of shipping costs,
increase bilateral trade more for country pairs with greater bilateral distance. In
other words, γ1 < 0 in Equation (3.4). The results are reported in Table 3.8. The
key coefficient of interest γ1 is negative and statistically negative from 0 at 1%. Bi-
lateral distance has a strong and negative effect on bilateral trade, and the effect is
stronger when the cost of shipping is higher. The Freight Cost Index from Hummels
(2007) decreases from a value of 2.03 in 1962 to the normalized value of 1.00 in
2000. Therefore, the effect of distance on bilateral trade has decrease by 11.5% over
the period according to the estimates. This is the key variation I exploit in the IV
strategy. Additionally, population is also a strong predictor of bilateral trade.16 In
practice, both sources of time variation are necessary to have a relatively strong
first stage in the 2SLS regression. Since the population size of a country may have
a direct effect on its national saving rate, I include log of population as a control
variable in the 2SLS regression in addition to the standard controls in Column (3)
of Table 3.4. The identifying assumption is that the shipping cost index (common
to all countries), and the populations of a country’s trade partners, are exogenous
with respect to its gross national saving rate and gross investment rate.
Since the sample is reduced by the use of trade flow data, I report the fixed-
15Since I have bilateral trade data from 1962 to 2000, the average predicted trade shares for
1962-1965 are used in place of the average for 1961-1965.
16In Table 3.8, the populations of Country i and Country j have different effects on bilateral
trade shares. This is consistent with the cross-section estimates in Frankel and Romer (1999).
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effects OLS estimates for the smaller sample in Column (1) of Table 3.9. The
results from the fixed-effects 2SLS regressions are presented in Column (2). The
first-stage F-statistic for the excluded instrument is 6.4, lower than the rule-of-
thumb critical value of 10. According to the 2SLS results, a one-percentage-point
increase in the Trade/GDP ratio raises the national saving rate by 0.228 percentage
point, larger than the increase of 0.118 percentage point in the fixed-effects OLS
regression. On the other hand, I do not find a positive effect of trade openness on
the gross investment rate in the 2SLS regression. Table 3B.1 and Table 3B.2 in
Appendix 3B show that the results are robust to additional controls, and exclusion
of any single region from the sample, respectively.17
3.4 Discussion
To summarize the empirical results so far, I find a strong relationship between
openness and the saving rate in a cross section and a panel of countries. I find
a much weaker relationship between openness and the investment rate. Taken to-
gether, these results provide strong evidence that a supply-side channel of increased
capital accumulation is operative following an increase in trade openness. The find-
ing of a robust positive relationship between openness and the aggregate saving rate
is consistent with the theoretical results in the second chapter. However, the mech-
anism emphasized in the theoretical model is not the only potential explanation for
the observed saving-openness relationship.
17The coefficient on trade openness is positive but statistically insignificant when I additionally
control for the trade balance in the 2SLS regression of the national saving rate.
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One plausible alternative explanation is that trade openness decreases the la-
bor share of income.18 If the saving rate of labor income is lower than that of
capital income, a decrease in the labor share of income can increase the aggregate
saving rate. Another related explanation is that the increased income share for the
very top group (“the exporters”) comes at the expense of smaller income shares for
low-income groups (“the workers”), rather than for other high-income groups (“the
domestic producers”). For example, a change in the competitive environment, re-
sulting from increased trade openness, may allow superstar entrepreneurs to charge
higher markups.19 To distinguish the proposed mechanism from alternative expla-
nations, I use data on the labor share of income from Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) as an additional control in the fixed-effects panel regression.20 The results
are presented in Column (9) of Table 3.5. Although the sample is substantially
reduced, the coefficient on the Trade/GDP ratio remains positive and statistically
significant. This provides some evidence in favor of the proposed mechanism.
Another explanation is that the income shares of various groups are inde-
pendent of trade openness, but trade openness increases the saving rate of certain
income groups. Since the saving rate of low income groups has a small effect on
the aggregate saving rate, the saving rate of high income groups should increase at
least moderately for this alternative explanation to be plausible. In the theoretical
18Harrison (2005) studies the relationship between globalization and the labor share of income.
Her results suggest that rising trade openness reduces the labor share of income.
19Using data from Slovenia, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) find that exporters charge higher
markups on average, and markups increase upon export entry.
20Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) provide data on the labor share of income in the corporate
sector, and the overall labor share. I use the overall labor share of income, as this variable is
available for a larger number of countries.
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results in Section 2.3, I do not find an increase in the saving rate for exporters.
However, to distinguish empirically the proposed mechanism from the alternative
explanation, we would need to examine the entire distribution of income and saving
rates in a country before and after a trade shock. I leave this for future research.
Capital Flows Across Countries
For simplicity, I have assumed in the theoretical model that capital is immobile
across countries, so that S = I holds for each country.21 While Levine and Renelt
(1992), Wacziarg (2001) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) find a positive relationship
between trade openness and the investment rate, I find this relationship to be sta-
tistically weaker than the relationship between trade openness and the saving rate.
I do not find a significant relationship between trade openness and the investment
rate in some specifications. On the one hand, this supports my emphasis on the
supply-side channel of capital accumulation. On the other hand, the weaker rela-
tionship between trade openness and the investment rate suggests that some of the
trade-induced increase in saving flows abroad.
If capital is mobile across countries in the model, some of the trade-induced
increase in saving in a country may flow abroad and result in higher investment in the
recipient country. Workers in the recipient country would benefit from higher wages
through a higher marginal productivity of labor. In other words, with capital flows
across countries, the positive welfare effect of a trade-induced increase in saving
21Feldstein and Horioka (1980) documents a strong relationship between domestic saving and
investment. Bai and Zhang (2010) use a model with financial frictions to explain the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle.
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in one country may be shared with workers in different countries.22 Therefore,
relaxation of the S = I assumption has implications for the distribution of gains
from trade between countries. However, a quantitative analysis of distributional
effects between countries is beyond the scope of this study.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I test the key predictions of the model using country-level
data. Using fixed-effects regressions in a large panel of countries, I find a significant
and positive correlation between trade openness and the aggregate saving rate. I
find a much weaker relationship between trade openness and the investment rate.
Furthermore, I show that greater trade openness has a stronger effect on the aggre-
gate saving rate in a country where the initial top 10% share (before any changes
in trade openness) of total income is higher. This is in line with my model, where
the increase in the aggregate saving is driven by top income earners. Additionally,
I build on the gravity-based IV approach pioneered by Frankel and Romer (1999)
and extend it to a panel setting. I find a larger effect of trade openness on the
aggregate saving rate in the fixed-effects panel regressions with IV than without IV.
The results provide strong evidence that a supply-side channel of increased capital
accumulation is operative following an increase in trade openness.
22In the extreme case of small economies with perfect capital account openness, the trade-
induced increase in the aggregate saving rate would have no impact on the investment rate, or
additional welfare gains for workers, in the domestic economy.
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Chapter 4: Openness, Inequality and
the Chinese Saving Rate Puzzle
4.1 Introduction
Since the start of reforms in the late 1970s, China has played an increasingly
important role in the global economy. Panel A of Figure 4.1 plots exports, imports
and net foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP in China from 1982
to 2011. As shown in the figure, China’s exports as a share of GDP increased from
8.4% in 1982 to a peak of 39.1% in 2006.1 The evolution of imports and net FDI in
China follow a similar pattern.
The integration of China into the global economy has been accompanied by a
large increase in the national saving rate. As shown in Panel B of Figure 4.1, the
gross domestic saving rate has increased from around 35%, which was already high
compared to other countries, to a peak of 52.7% in 2009. Household saving, defined
as the difference between disposable income and consumption expenditures, has
been the largest component of aggregate saving for most of the period. According
to Yang, Zhang, and Zhou (2012), the household saving rate increased by 11.3
1The subsequent drop in Export/GDP ratio is related to the 2008 global financial crisis. The
drastic fall in global trade during the 2008 financial crisis is termed “Great Trade Collapse.”
94






























percentage points, from 15.3% in 1990 to 26.9% in 2007, in the data from the China
Urban Household Survey (CHUS).2 Panel B also plots the gross investment rate in
China from 1982 to 2011. While the gross investment rate has also risen dramatically
over the period, it has been persistently lower than the gross domestic saving rate.
In light of the theoretical model in Chapter 2, it is interesting to examine the
relationship between openness and aggregate saving behavior in China. The hypoth-
2Throughout this chapter, the (average) household saving rate of a group is defined as the
difference between average disposable income and average consumption expenditures, as a fraction
of average disposable income; I do not take the arithmetic average of individual household saving
rates in any instance.
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esis in this chapter is that greater openness in China has increased the household
saving rate by increasing the income shares received by the high-income households
who have the highest saving rate.
To focus on the growth experience of China, this chapter deviates from the
framework in Chapter 2 in two ways. First, while the model in Chapter 2 considers
only openness to international trade, this chapter considers the effects of openness
more generally, or “globalization,” of which openness to international trade and
openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) are two important components.3 Sec-
ond, I consider inequality among workers as well as inequality among entrepreneurs
in this chapter. A large literature has found that greater trade openness typically
increases wage inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Harrison, McLaren, and
McMillan, 2011). To the extent that workers with higher wages have higher saving
rates, an increase in wage inequality can also contribute to the higher saving rate in
China.
The hypothesized relationship between openness and the household saving
rate in China has two crucial components: a link between openness and income
inequality and a link between income inequality and the household saving rate. A
comprehensive examination of the hypothesis should cover both the component links
and the overall relationship. Han, Liu, and Zhang (2012) find that globalization has
a large effect on wage inequality in China.4 In Section 4.2, I show that there has
3Openness to FDI can increase top income inequality through two channels. First, foreign
firms need to hire local managers. Second, the profits of domestic firms who receive investment
and foreign technology from foreign partners can increase significantly relative to those non-joint-
venture firms. Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) note the difficulty of separately identifying
the effects of trade openness and FDI openness.
4In principle, I could use micro-data to examine the relationship between openness and income
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been a large increase in top income shares in China since the late 1970s, and that
the household saving rate of the high-income households is extremely high compared
to the low-income households. In Section 4.3, I use data from the China Household
Income Project (CHIP) to show that there is a strong correlation between income
inequality and the household saving rate across Chinese counties. Additionally,
using a simple counter-factual exercise, I show that the observed increase in income
inequality can play a quantitatively important role for the rise of the household
saving rate in China. Finally, in Section 4.4, using provincial-level panel data and
exploiting the 1992 liberalization episode, I show that greater openness has a large
positive effect on the household saving rate of a province in China.
The high saving rate of China is the subject of numerous papers, perhaps
because it is seen as an issue at the heart of global imbalances (Bernanke, 2005).
Yang, Zhang, and Zhou (2012) provide a comprehensive review of the relevant liter-
ature. While aggregate saving consists of savings by government, by the corporate
sector and by the household sector, most of the literature has focused on the house-
hold sector.5 Earlier research on the Chinese household saving rate, such as Kraay
(2000) and Modigliani and Cao (2004), has focused on demographic changes re-
lated to the life-cycle hypothesis. Chamon and Prasad (2010) and Chamon, Liu,
and Prasad (2013) emphasize the role of precautionary motives and income uncer-
inequality among entrepreneurs in China. However, this is a difficult task given the lack of data
on high-income households from different years. As will be discussed later, the China Household
Finance Survey has good coverage of high-income households. However, the survey was started
only in 2011.
5While I focus on the household saving rate in this chapter, I note that accounting for cor-
porate saving would likely strengthen the empirical results in this chapter, since the high-income
households are more likely to own shares of firms.
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tainty.6 Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013) focus on the role of the one-child
policy. Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that the higher male-female sex ratio in China
contributes to the high household saving rate, as the young males and their parents
save aggressively (for example, towards the purchase of an apartment) to improve
the prospects in the marriage market. Wang and Wen (2011) study the role of
housing prices and conclude that the rising housing price in China cannot account
for the rise in the household saving rate.
It is important to note that while a given channel may be successful in explain-
ing the rise in saving rate by a certain set of households, the channel may contribute
little to the increase in the overall household saving rate, if the households affected
by the proposed channel account for only a small share of total income. Citing the
well-known positive relationship between the household saving rate and income at
the micro-level, both Gan (2013) and Lin (2012) argue that the rising household
saving rate in China is driven by top income shares. This chapter goes a step fur-
ther than Gan (2013) and Lin (2012) by proposing globalization as a driver behind
rising top income shares in China.
4.2 Inequality in China
In this chapter, I make use of multiple data sources. It is useful to give an
overview of the main advantages of the various sources. The China Urban House-
hold Surveys (CUHS) would be best suited to answer many of the questions raised
6Song and Yang (2010) document a flattening of the age-earning profiles and use this empirical
fact to explain both the rising household saving rate and the unusual U-shaped increase in saving
rates over the life cycle.
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in this chapter. Unfortunately, the data are not publicly available. In the expo-
sition, I rely on evidence on studies published using the CUHS data. To describe
the evolution of income inequality in China, I rely on data from China Health and
Nutritional Surveys (CHNS), which are conducted by the University of North Car-
olina at Chapel Hill and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
A major advantage of CHNS surveys is that they cover multiple years (1989, 1991,
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009). However, the CHNS data do not contain
comprehensive consumption data. To examine the household saving rate at the
county and household level, I use data from the China Household Income Projects
(CHIP). I also examine data from China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) for
a better coverage of high-income households in China. Finally, I supplement the
province-level dataset constructed by Wei and Zhang (2011) with additional data
series from various statistical yearbooks to study the relationship between openness
and the household saving rate in Chinese provinces. More details on the various
datasets are provided later.
Figure 4.2 plots the top income shares in China from 1986 to 2003. The series
are constructed by Piketty and Qian (2009) from the CUHS survey data.7 The share
of total income received by the top 10% households increased from 17.4% in 1985 to
27.9% in 2003, while the income share received by the top 1% households increased
from 2.7% to 5.9%.8
7The data series are available through the World Top Income Database. In the World Top
Income Database, data series for China are the only series constructed from household surveys
while data series for other countries are typically constructed using tax return data. This is a
relevant point as household surveys are more likely to underestimate top income shares.
8The figures above do not include capital gains in total income.
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It is informative to examine the evolution of income inequality among en-
trepreneur households and workers households separately. Since the CUHS data
are not publicly available, I turn to data from China Health and Nutrition Sur-
vey (CHNS) which has been used extensively to study income dynamics in China.
The survey covers several provinces including Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan,
Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou. I use data from the survey conducted in
1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009.9 The number of households
in the survey ranges from 3439 in year 1993 to 3654 in year 2009. In line with
the model in Chapter 2, I classify a household as an entrepreneur household if at
least one household member is either (1) listed as having a primary occupation of
“administrator/executive/ manager;” or (2) listed as self-employed with at least one
9Another round of survey was conducted in 2011. However, the sample from this year is
systematically different from those in other years in terms of region coverage and sample size.
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unrelated employee. I classify all other households as “worker households.” This
classification is consistent with the model in Chapter 2, in the sense that the in-
come of an “entrepreneur” is tied to the performance of the firm and their income
risk is uninsurable. With the above definitions, I classify about 350 households as
“entrepreneur households” in each year. Panel B of Figure 4.3 plots the number
of entrepreneur households as a share of total sample size, as well as the share of
total income received by the entrepreneur households. The share of entrepreneur
households declined slightly from about 11% in the early 1990s to 8.5% in 2009,
while the income share received by entrepreneur households follows a similar but
milder trend over the period. Not surprisingly, the average income of entrepreneur
households is substantially higher than non-entrepreneur households, as indicated
by the gap between the two lines in Panel B of Figure 4.3.
For each year, I then calculate the share of total entrepreneur income received
by the top 10% (in terms of income) entrepreneur households. The average number
of entrepreneur household is about 350, and I am calculating the income share of
the top 10% of these 350 entrepreneurs.10 I also calculate the share of total worker
income received by the top 10% (in terms of income) worker households. Figure
4.3 plots these top 10% income shares. While Figure 4.3 is consistent with Figure
4.2, it also suggests that the increase in top income shares is more substantial for
entrepreneur households than for worker households. According to the data, for
entrepreneur households, the top 10% income share increased from 25.2% in 1989
10I drop households at random to ensure that the group sizes are multiples of 10 to minimize
rounding errors.
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to 38.4% in 2009. For worker households, the top 10% income share increased from
28.5% to 33.3%.
Saving Rate and Income
It is well known that higher-income households tend to have higher saving
rates. Figure 4.4, taken from Yang et al. (2012), plots the history of the average
saving rate by household income quartile. Two main lessons can be drawn from
Figure 4.4. First, in line with evidence from other countries, the average household
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Figure 4.4: Saving Rate by Household Income Quartile (1988-2007)
Source:Yang et al. (2012) using Data from CUHS
saving rate is strongly correlated with household income in the cross section in any
year. In 2007, the average saving rate of households in the highest income quartile is
about 28 percentage points higher than in the lowest income quartile. Second, while
there was a large increase in the average saving rate of households in the highest
income quartile, the increase in the average saving rate for households in the middle
income quartiles is more modest. The average saving rate for the households in
the lowest income quartile does not have a clear trend over the period. It is also
important to note that the increase in the average saving rate in the upper income
quartiles can be driven by an increase in inequality within the quartiles, due to the
composition channel highlighted in this dissertation.11 Overall, Figure 4.4 points
to the importance of income distribution and the saving behaviors of high-income
11This hypothesis can be checked with the CUHS. Unfortunately, the CUHS data are not
publicly available.
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households in understanding the changes in the overall household saving rate in
China.
Researchers have noted that the household saving rate calculated from typical
household surveys is typically much lower than that from the aggregate data in the
flow of funds accounts. While different definitions of income and consumption may
also play a role, the discrepancy is mostly attributed to the low survey response
rate by high-income households who have higher propensity to save (Chamon et al.,
2013). In view of Figure 4.4, it is useful to study the household saving rate in China
with data on the saving behaviors of high-income households. I turn to data from
the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), conducted by Southwest University
of Finance and Economics. The China Household Finance Survey employs a multi-
stage stratified random sample design and is unique in its extensive coverage of high-
income households in China.12,13 The first wave of the survey was conducted in the
summer of 2011 and collected extensive information on the income and consumption
of 8438 households in 2010.
Following the same definitions as before, I group all the households in the
CHFS data into entrepreneur households and worker households. For each type of
household, I calculate the average saving rate for each income decile.14 As shown
in Panel A of Figure 4.5, the average household saving rate is much higher for the
12A comparable survey in the US is the Survey of Consumer Finances.
13In the CHFS data released to researchers, household disposable income is top-coded at
3,000,000 yuan (about 440,000 US dollars in 2010), which is much larger than in other house-
holds surveys in China.
14In the following calculations, I exclude households with negative income. I also exclude
a household if the total consumption of the household is more than ten times their household
disposable income. Inclusion of these households with very negative saving rates in the calculations
does not affect the conclusions in this section quantitatively.
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top income deciles than for the lower income deciles. The average household saving
rate is in fact negative for many of the lower income deciles, for both entrepreneur
households and worker households.15 This is consistent with the report on the initial
findings from the CHFS data by Gan (2013). In contrast, the average household
saving rate is 84.3% for the top 10% entrepreneur households and 59.5% for top
10% worker households. Panel B of Figure 4.5 plots the income received by house-
holds in each decile as a share of the group total, for entrepreneur households and
15The average saving rates for the 1st entrepreneur income decile, and for the 1st and 2nd
worker income deciles are not plotted in Panel A because they are significantly lower than -100%.
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worker households respectively. According to the CHFS data, the share of total
entrepreneur income received by the 10% households is 61.0%, while the share of
total worker income received by the top 10% households is 41.3% in 2010.16
4.3 Inequality and the Household Saving Rate
Panel A of Figure 4.3 shows that the income shares received by the top 10%
entrepreneur households and top 10% worker households have increased during the
integration of China into the world economy, while Panel A of Figure 4.5 shows that
top income households have much higher saving rates than the rest of population.
Although both Justin Lin Yifu (2012) and Li Gan (2013), two influential scholars
on the Chinese economy, have used the saving-rate-income relationship to propose a
relationship between the rising Chinese saving rate and increased inequality, it is not
clear whether the mechanism is quantitatively important. In the present subsection,
I attempt to answer this question.
4.3.1 Evidence from Household Surveys
This section examines whether there is a positive correlation between inequal-
ity and the household saving rate in China using household survey data. The liter-
ature which examines the correlation between the aggregate saving rate and income
inequality at the country level, for example Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000) and
16The top income shares in the 2010 CHFS data are much higher than those in the 2009 CHNS
data. While different survey years and geographic coverage are likely to play a role, a more
important explanation is that top income shares in the CHNS data are likely underestimated due
to the low survey response rate of high-income households. See Luo (2012) for a critical discussion
of the CHFS data.
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Table 4.1: Household Saving Rate and Inequality Across Chinese Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: County Level Regressions
Dependent Variable is County-level Household Saving Rate
Inequality Measure Top 10% Share Gini Coefficient
Inequality within County 0.589*** 0.562*** 0.371*** 0.364***
(0.135) (0.136) (0.104) (0.106)
Log County Average Income 12.44*** 13.57*** 13.75*** 14.76***
(2.067) (2.205) (2.174) (2.272)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N Counties 203 203 203 203
Panel B: Household Level Regressions
Dependent Variable is Individual Household Saving Rate
Inequality Measure Top 10% Share Gini Coefficient
Inequality within County -0.0167 0.0259 0.0529 0.106
(0.239) (0.229) (0.202) (0.202)
Log Household Income 51.58*** 52.31*** 51.57*** 52.31***
(16.67) (16.87) (16.65) (16.86)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N Counties 203 203 203 203
N households 16445 16445 16445 16445
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The standard errors in Panel B are
clustered at county level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. The set of control variables in Columns (2) and (4) include shares of population
younger than 20, primary age population, sex ratio and share of SOE employment in total
employment at the county level.
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Cook (1995), is inconclusive. A difficulty in the literature is that the measures of
inequality used are constructed from household-level surveys in different countries
with potentially incompatible survey designs. In this section, I construct the house-
hold saving rate and inequality measures at the county level from a single household
data set. I turn to data from China Household Income Project (CHIP), conducted by
a group of Chinese and international researchers with assistance from National Bu-
reau of Statistics.17 I use data from three years, 1995, 2002 and 2007.18 I construct
the household saving rate, share of total income received by the top 10% households
and the Gini coefficient using the CHIP data.19 This approach ensures that these
key variables are constructed consistently across all Chinese counties. The disad-
vantage is that each county-level value is calculated from a relatively small number
of households. I drop counties with fewer than 30 households. In constructing the
top 10% income share, I drop some households at random to ensure that the num-
ber of households in each county are multiples of 10.20 Lastly, I construct a set
of control variables from the same data, including the share of population younger
than 20, the share of population of primary age population, sex ratio and share of
SOE employment in total employment at the county level.
In Panel A of Table 4.1, I analyze the relationship between the household
saving rate and measures of inequality at the county level. In addition to a measure
17http://www.ciidbnu.org/chip/index.asp
18I did not use data from 1988 as the 1988 survey questionnaire omitted important consumption
items compared to the later surveys.
19Recall that the household saving rate at the county level is defined as one minus the ratio
between average household consumption and average household income.
20For a county with 50 households, I then calculate the share of total income received by the
five households with the highest income.
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of inequality, I include the log of average household income as a key right-hand-side
variable. Since different counties are covered in each year, I cannot use county fixed
effects. Instead, I use province-year fixed effects in the regressions. As shown in
Column (1), the positive correlation between the county-level household saving rate
and the share of income received by the top 10% households is statistically different
from zero at 1%. A 10-percentage-points increase in the top 10% income share is
associated with an increase of 5.89 percentage points in the household saving rate.
This is a very large effect. In Column (2), I add additional controls and find that
the coefficient on inequality is not affected. In Column (3) and Column (4), I find
that the results are unchanged when I use the Gini coefficient as the measure of
inequality.
The positive correlation between the household saving rate and income in-
equality in Panel A is suggestive of the theoretical mechanism advanced in this
dissertation, but an alternative mechanism is capable of generating this positive
correlation. Jin, Li, and Wu (2011) find in household-level regressions that house-
hold consumption is negatively correlated with income inequality after controlling
for household income. They rationalize their results using status-seeking motives.
Therefore, one important question is whether inequality is correlated with the house-
hold saving rate at the household level in my data.21 I address this question in Panel
B. I conduct regressions similar to those in Panel A but at the household level. More
precisely, I use the saving rate and log of income of individual households, but keep
21This is the same as asking if the inequality is correlated with the unweighted average of
individual household saving rate at the county level.
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the rest of the county-level variables unchanged. The coefficient on the inequality
measure is not statistically different from zero in any specification. This shows that
the income inequality at the county level is not correlated with the across-the-board
household saving rates (the unweighted average).
4.3.2 Changes in Income Distribution and the Household Saving
Rate: A Simple Exercise
Table 4.2: Income Distribution and Household Saving Rate
Panel A: Quantities Assumed to be Time-variant
Entrepreneur Households’ Saving Rate: Top 10% 84.3%
Entrepreneur Households’ Saving Rate: Bottom 90% 31.1%
Worker Households’ Saving Rate: Top 10% 59.5%
Worker Households’ Saving Rate: Bottom 90% 2.5%
Entrepreneurs’ Share of Total Income 32.1%
Panel B: Experiments and Results
Experiment: (1) (2) (3)
Increase in Top 10% Entrepreneurs’ Share 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
Increase in Top 10% Workers’ Share 5.0% 7.5% 10.0%
Change in Saving Rate of Entrepreneurs 5.3% 8.0% 10.6%
Change in Saving Rate of Workers 2.9% 4.3% 5.7%
Change in Household Saving Rate 3.6% 5.5% 7.3%
In this subsection, I conduct a simple exercise to demonstrate the quantita-
tive importance of the mechanism. I divide all the households into four groups,
top 10% entrepreneur households, bottom 90% entrepreneur households, top 10%
worker households, and bottom 90% worker households. I am interested in the
following question: holding the household saving rate of each group fixed, and hold-
ing the share of total income received by the entrepreneur households constant, to
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what extent can an increase in the top 10% income share (within each respective
occupation group) affect the household saving rate?
I consider an experiment in which the income share of the top 10% entrepreneur
households increases by 15 percentage points while the income share of the top 10%
worker households increases by 7.5 percentage points. These numbers are chosen
to be comparable to the actual increases observed in Panel A of Figure 4.3. I also
consider two additional experiments with different changes in the distribution of
income.
Table 4.2 summarizes the experiments and the results. Depending on the
experiments considered, the household saving rate in China increases by 3.6, 5.5
and 7.3 percentage points respectively. Therefore, the simple exercise in Table 4.2
suggests that the rise in top income shares can have a quantitatively important
effect on the household saving rate in China. For comparison, Chamon et al. (2013)
find that the increase in income uncertainty and the reform of the pension system
from 1997 to 2007 can account for a 5.3 percentage-points increase in the household
saving rate in China. I now turn to the relationship between openness and the
household saving rate.
4.4 Openness and the Household Saving Rate in China
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping, the secretary-general of the Communist Party, un-
veiled a number of policy initiatives to accelerate the outward-oriented liberalization
of the Chinese economy. Over the course of the 1992 liberalization, provinces on
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the coast experienced much greater increase in international trade and net FDI. I
exploit a province’s differential increase in openness according to its distance to the
coast and analyze the relationship between the household saving rate and openness
in a panel of provinces over 1981-2000. I exclude the years after 2000, as China
undertook a massive infrastructure project to develop its western provinces in 2000
(Tian, 2004).22
4.4.1 Empirical Strategy
I test the hypothesis that greater openness increases the household saving rate
using provincial-level panel data. I propose an empirical strategy using the 1992
trade liberalization episode in China. This empirical strategy is similar to Han,
Liu, and Zhang (2012), who study wage inequality by contrasting wages between
high-exposure provinces and low-exposure provinces. My main specification is
Sit = β0 + β1log(DCoast)i × Post92it + β2Xit + ci + µt + vit, (4.1)
where Sit is the household saving rate, log(DCoast)i is the log of a province’s distance
to the coast and used as a proxy for access to foreign markets, Post92it is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one for years after 1992, Xit is a vector of control
variables, and ci and µt are province and time fixed effects, respectively. Following
Wei and Zhang (2011), the independent variables in Xit include the sex ratio of
the population aged 7-21, the share of population younger than 20, the share of
22Moreover, China’s accession into the World Trade Organization in 2001 is another watershed
event in China’s embrace of globalization (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006).
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population of primary age, the share of population enrolled under social security,
and the share of state-owned-enterprises (SOE) employment in total employment.
Since current income is endogenous to the household saving rate, I lag the log of
income by four years in the baseline regression, but use the log of contemporaneous
income as a robustness check. According to the theory outlined in Chapter 2, β1 < 0.
The results from Equation 4.1 would indicate whether greater openness has a
statistically significant effect on the household saving rate. However, it is harder to
interpret the magnitude of the results from Equation 4.1. To facilitate the interpre-
tation, I study the following specification:
Sit = α0 + α1Openit + α2Xit + ci + µt + vijt, (4.2)
where Openit is a measure of openness. I instrument for openness with the inter-
action term log(DCoast)i ×Post92it. The exclusion restriction of the IV strategy is
that distance to the coast affects the household saving rate only through openness.
This is similar to the empirical approach in Wei and Wu (2001), who study the
effects of globalization on urban-rural income inequality in Chinese municipalities.23
In implementing Equation 4.2, I use two different measures of openness, the
Trade/GDP ratio and the FDI/GDP ratio. The goal is not to separately identify
the effects of trade openness vis-a-vis FDI openness. Instead, the Trade/GDP ratio
and the FDI/GDP ratio are intended as two different measures of a broad concept of
openness. This point is crucial in establishing the validity of the IV approach, since
23More precisely, Wei and Wu (2001) use the minimum of the distance to Hong Kong or Shanghai
as an instrument for changes in municipality openness over 1988-1993. I find that my measure of
distance to the coast results in a stronger instrument for the period 1981-2000.
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Chinese provinces closer to the coast not only had larger increases in international
trade, but also had larger increases in foreign investment in the period under study.
Data Description
I use the dataset constructed by Wei and Zhang (2011) as my primary data
source, and supplement the dataset with the Trade/GDP ratio, the FDI/GDP ratio
and the gross investment rate from both national and provincial statistical books,
and the distance to the coast of each province.24 I exclude Chongqing from the
analysis because it was administered as part of Sichuan Province until 1997. The
Trade/GDP ratio of Beijing is abnormally large while data for the FDI/GDP ratio
for Tibet are unavailable, and I drop these two provinces when appropriate.
4.4.2 Results
The regression results based on Equation 4.1 are presented in Table 4.3. Ac-
cording to Column (1), comparing the household saving rate before and after 1992,
a province has a larger increase in the household saving rate, by 0.922 percentage
point (1.330× ln(2) = 0.922), than a province with twice the distance to the coast.
The coefficient is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 4.45.
Column (2) of Table 4.3 controls for contemporaneous income instead of lagged
income. Consistent with the findings in the literature (c.f. Wei and Zhang (2011)),
24To measure a province’s distance to the coast, I calculate the distance in kilometers of each
city in the province to the nearest port city (which may be from a different province), and then
take the average across the cities. I group the years from 1981-2000 into five 4-year intervals.25
Since I use the log of coastal distance in the regressions, a city on the coast is assigned a coastal
distance of 1 kilometer.
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the household saving rate is strongly correlated with current income. The coefficient
on log(DCoast)i×Post92it is reduced by half but remains statistically significant at
5.0%. This suggests that openness has a significant effect on the household saving
rate beyond its effect on current income.
The results in Column (1) may be driven by the increased return to investment
in the coastal provinces, as households save more aggressively to take advantage of
the investment opportunity. Column (3) shows that the coefficient on log(DCoast)i×
Post92it remains statistically significant at 1.0% when I control for the investment
rate of a province.26
A threat to the empirical strategy is the reform of SOEs in Chinese provinces.
Column (4) drops the observations from 1997 to 2000 when the privatization of
state-owned enterprises began (Bai, Lu, and Tao, 2009). The coefficient on the
log(DCoast)i × Postit increases and is statistically significant at 1.0%.
Another alternative explanation is that households in the coastal provinces
anticipated the faster increase in openness, and increased their saving rate to take
advantage of future economic opportunities. The results in Column (1) of Table 4.3
may be a reflection of this hypothesis if the household saving rate is very persistent.
In Column (5), I use the same independent variables as the baseline specification
but use the lagged household saving rate as the dependent variable. The coefficient
on interaction term is positive and statistically insignificant. This is at odds with
the alternative explanation described above.
26Defined as gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP of the province.
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Table 4.3: Household Saving Rate in China (1981-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Cur-Y Invest Pre-1997 Lag Lead
Log (Distance to Coast) -1.330*** -0.603** -1.184*** -1.543*** 0.0973 -0.234
X Post 1992 (0.299) (0.265) (0.299) (0.360) (0.309) (0.421)
Log Income (Lag) 5.379 4.862 5.477 23.66*** 4.800
(3.754) (3.638) (6.250) (4.071) (4.627)




N Provinces 30 30 30 30 30 30
N Observations 146 149 146 116 146 146
Robust standard errors, clustered at provincial level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We group the years from 1981-2000 into five non-overlapping 4-year
intervals. All regressions control for the sex ratio of the population aged 7-21, the share of population younger than
20, the share of population of primary age, the share of population enrolled under social security, and the share of SOE
employment in total employment. Column (1) presents the baseline results; Column (2) controls for (log of) current
income; Column (3) controls for the investment rate; Column (4) excludes data between 1997 and 2000; Column (5) uses
the lagged household saving rate as the dependent variable; Column (6) uses the future household saving rate as the
dependent variable.
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In Column (6), I use the future household saving rate as the dependent vari-
able. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive but statistically insignificant.
Taken together, Column (5) and Column (6) provide additional support that the
differential increase in the household saving rate across Chinese provinces coincided
with the 1992 liberalization.
Taken together, Table 4.3 demonstrates that the provinces closer to the coast
had a larger increase in the household saving rate after 1992 than the interior
provinces. This provides support for the hypothesis that greater openness increases
the household openness in China. To relate the findings above to conventional
measure of openness, I turn to the 2SLS results from estimating Equation 4.2.
Column (1) of Table 4.4 presents the OLS estimates of Equation 4.2 when
I use the Trade/GDP ratio as the measure of openness. The coefficient on the
Trade/GDP ratio is positive but statistically insignificant. The results from the
corresponding 2SLS regression are presented in Column (2). The results from the
first-stage regressions are reported in Panel B. In Column (2), the coefficient on the
instrument is of the expected sign and statistically significant. The F-statistic for the
excluded instrument is 5.1, indicating that the instrument is relatively weak. The
2SLS point estimate on the Trade/GDP ratio is positive and statistically significant
at 5%. A one-percentage-point increase in the Trade/GDP ratio increases the saving
rate by 0.440 percentage point. In the WDI data (Figure 4.1), the Trade/GDP
ratio increases from 15.1% to 44.2% from 1982 to 2000. A naive extrapolation of
the results in Column (2) indicates that the increase in openness over the period
in China can result in an increase of the household saving rate by 12.8 percentage
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Table 4.4: Household Saving Rate and Openness in China (1981-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS and 2SLS Regressions
Trade/GDP FDI/GDP
Specification OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Openness 0.0598 0.440** 0.473*** 0.633***
(0.0385) (0.198) (0.0974) (0.139)
Log Income (Lag) 11.64*** -3.659 6.496 4.189
(2.814) (7.903) (4.148) (3.880)
Panel B: First Stage Regressions
Log (Distance to Coast) -2.995** -1.943***
X Post 1992 (1.329) (0.215)
Log Income (Lag) 19.29 1.068
(12.00) (2.796)
Excluded IV F-stat 5.076 81.40
N Provinces 29 29 29 29
N Observations 141 141 136 136
Robust standard errors, clustered at provincial level, are reported in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We group
the years from 1981-2000 into five non-overlapping 4-year intervals. All regressions
control for the sex ratio of the population aged 7-21, the share of population younger
than 20, the share of population of primary age, the share of population enrolled under
social security, and the share of SOE employment in total employment. Columns (1)-
(2) use the Trade/GDP ratio as the measure of openness while Columns (3)-(4) use
the FDI/GDP ratio as the measure of openness.
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points.
Columns (3) and (4) present the OLS and 2SLS results respectively when
I use the FDI/GDP ratio as the measure of openness. Column (3) shows that
the household saving rate is strongly associated with the FDI/GDP ratio in the
OLS results. According to Column (4), when the FDI/GDP ratio is used as the
measure of openness, the first stage regression is strong, with a F-statistic of 81.4
for the excluded IV test. The coefficient on the FDI/GDP ratio is positive and
statistically significant at 1%. The household saving rate increases by 0.529 standard
deviation for a one-standard-deviation increase in the FDI/GDP ratio, compared to
an increase of 1.444 standard deviations for a one-standard-deviation increase in the
Trade/GDP ratio.27
Table 4.5 presents additional 2SLS robustness checks analogous to the specifi-
cations in Table 4.3. The 2SLS results are robust to controlling for current income,
controlling for the investment rate, and exclusion of data from the period between
1997 and 2000. I do not find a statistically coefficient on the openness measure when
I use the past or future household saving rate as the dependent variable. A caveat
is that the first stage regression is even weaker when I control for current income or
the investment rate in the specification with the Trade/GDP ratio as the measure
of openness.
It is interesting to compare the results from using the two different measures
of openness. Clearly, there is a stronger spatial pattern in the FDI/GDP ratio than
27In the WDI data (Figure 4.1), the FDI/GDP ratio increases from 0.211% to 6.25% from 1982
to 1993, before declining to 3.2% in 2000.
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Table 4.5: Household Saving Rate in China: Robustness of 2SLS Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cur-Y Invest Pre-1997 Lag Lead
Panel A: Trade/GDP as the Measure of Openness
Openness 0.269 0.390** 0.428** -0.0235 0.0690
(0.230) (0.197) (0.168) (0.0870) (0.113)
Log Income (Lag) -3.230 1.976 23.61*** 3.805
(7.309) (8.389) (4.662) (5.320)




Excluded IV F-stat 2.586 3.453 7.561 5.076 5.076
N Provinces 29 29 29 29 29
N Observations 144 141 112 141 141
Panel B: FDI/GDP as the Measure of Openness
Openness 0.348*** 0.571*** 0.621*** -0.00946 0.123
(0.124) (0.141) (0.128) (0.136) (0.197)
Log Income (Lag) 4.170 4.012 21.64*** 3.315
(3.689) (6.406) (3.661) (4.216)




Excluded IV F-stat 100.1 97.87 33.85 81.40 81.40
N Provinces 29 29 29 29 29
N Observations 137 136 107 136 136
Robust standard errors, clustered at provincial level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We group the years from
1981-2000 into five non-overlapping 4-year intervals. All regressions control for the sex ratio
of the population aged 7-21, the share of population younger than 20, the share of population
of primary age, the share of population enrolled under social security, and the share of SOE
employment in total employment. Column (1) controls for (log of) current income; Column (2)
controls for the investment rate; Column (3) excludes data between 1997 and2000; Column (4)
uses the lagged household saving rate as the dependent variable; Column (5) uses the future
household saving rate as the dependent variable.
120
in the Trade/GDP ratio. This is consistent with the fact that a central part of the
1992 reform was to attract inflows of foreign capital, and many policies aimed at
attracting FDI were first implemented in provinces on the coast. As a result, the
first stage of the 2SLS regressions is much stronger when the FDI/GDP ratio is
used as the measure of openness. I interpret the results in Table 4.2 and Table 4.5
as reflecting the effects of openness broadly defined, rather than the effects of the
Trade/GDP ratio or the FDI/GDP ratio per se, since the different dimensions of
openness are highly correlated with each other.28
To further investigate whether the increase in the household saving rate is
driven by higher returns to investment, I repeat the analysis in Table 4.3 but use the
investment rate as the dependent variable. If the increase in household saving rate
is mostly driven by greater returns to investment, we should see a more pronounced
spatial pattern in the investment rate than in the household saving rate.
28In this chapter, I consistently find that the FDI/GDP ratio to have a more significant effect on
the household saving rate. One explanation is that the differential increase in the FDI/GDP ratio
dominates the differential increase in the Trade/GDP ratio in the 1992 reform. Another potential
explanation is that the data on the Trade/GDP ratio is less reliable on the FDI/GDP ratio. For
example, the total trade of a province is calculated based on the place of firm registration, rather
than the actual place of production and import destination.
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Table 4.6: Investment Rate in China (1981-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Cur-Y Saving Pre-1997 Lagged Lead
Log (Distance to Coast) -0.960* -0.451 -0.458 -1.189* -1.770** 1.166
X Post 1992 (0.556) (0.473) (0.572) (0.645) (0.716) (0.877)
Log Income (Lag) 3.382 1.352 8.511 11.94 -3.357
(5.799) (5.872) (6.199) (7.175) (8.759)
Log Income (Current) 19.35**
(7.985)
Household Saving Rate 0.377*
(0.191)
N Provinces 30 30 30 30 30 30
N Observations 146 148 146 116 145 146
Robust standard errors, clustered at provincial level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We group the years from 1981-2000 into five non-overlapping 4-year
intervals. All regressions control for the sex ratio of the population aged 7-21, the share of population younger
than 20, the share of population of primary age, the share of population enrolled under social security, and the
share of SOE employment in total employment. Column (1) presents the baseline results; Column (2) controls for
(log of) current income; Column (3) controls for the household saving rate; Column (4) excludes data between
1997 and 2000; Column (5) uses the lagged investment rate as the dependent variable; Column (6) uses the future
investment rate as the dependent variable.
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According to Column (1) of Table 4.6, comparing the investment rate before
and after 1992, a province has a larger increase in investment, by 0.665 percentage
point (0.960× ln(2) = 0.665), than a province with twice the distance to the coast.
The coefficient is statistically significant at 10%. As in Table 4.3, the coefficient on
log(DCoast)i × Post92it is approximately halved when I control for current income
instead of lagged income in Column (2). In Column (3), when I control for the
household saving rate, the coefficient on log(DCoast)i × Post92it is not statistically
significant. This suggests that the relationship between openness and the investment
rate in Column (1) of Table 4.6 may be a consequence of, rather than a cause of the
relationship between openness and the household saving rate. Column (4) shows
that the baseline investment rate results are robust to the exclusion of data from
the period between 1997 and 2000. Column (5) indicates that the investment rate
has risen in the coastal provinces prior to 1992, while Column (6) does not find a
statistically significant effect of the interaction term on the future investment rate.
Table 4.7 presents the OLS and 2SLS results when I use the Trade/GDP ratio
and the FDI/GDP ratio as measures of openness to study the relationship between
openness and the investment rate. Comparing the 2SLS results from Table 4.7
with those from Table 4.4, I find that the relationship between openness and the
household saving rate is stronger than that between openness and the investment
rate in terms of statistical significance. In terms of magnitude, a one standard
deviation increase in the Trade/GDP ratio increases the household saving rate by
1.444 standard deviations, and the investment rate by 0.684 standard deviation. A
one standard deviation increase in the FDI/GDP ratio increases the investment rate
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by 0.330 standard deviation, compared to an increase of 0.529 standard deviation in
the household saving rate. Therefore, reminiscent of the empirical results in Chapter
3, the relationship between the household saving rate and openness appears to be
stronger than the relationship between the investment rate and openness.
Table 4.7: Investment Rate and Openness in China (1981-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS and 2SLS Regressions
Measure of Openness: Trade/GDP FDI/GDP
Specification OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Openness 0.0146 0.287 0.615*** 0.543**
(0.0969) (0.207) (0.170) (0.257)
Log Income (Lag) 8.519 -2.453 -0.861 0.167
(5.726) (8.344) (7.261) (6.046)
Panel B: First Stage Regressions
Log (Distance to Coast) -2.995** -1.943***
X Post 1992 (1.329) (0.215)
Log Income (Lag) 19.29 1.068
(12.00) (2.796)
Excluded IV F-stat 5.076 81.40
N Provinces 29 29 29 29
N Observations 141 141 136 136
Robust standard errors, clustered at provincial level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We group the years from
1981-2000 into five non-overlapping 4-year intervals. All regressions control for the sex ratio of the
population aged 7-21, the share of population younger than 20, the share of population of primary
age, the share of population enrolled under social security, and the share of SOE employment in
total employment. Columns (1)-(2) use the Trade/GDP ratio as the measure of openness while
Columns (3)-(4) use the FDI/GDP ratio as the measure of openness.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that the integration of China into the
global economy contributed to the rising household saving rate in China through
the effect of globalization on income inequality. Using data from various household
surveys, I show that top income shares have increased over the past thirty years
in China. Furthermore, the saving rate of high-income households is much higher
than that of lower-income households. Lastly, using provincial-level panel data and
exploiting the 1992 trade liberalization in China to develop an IV strategy, I show
that greater openness has a large effect on the household saving rate of a province.
Some important modifications are needed in order to use the model to explain
quantitatively the rise in household saving in China. Data from household sur-
veys find that although the saving rates of worker households are lower than those
of entrepreneur households, worker households contribute substantially to overall
household saving in China. Additionally, wage inequality among worker households
is large and appears to be increasing with greater openness. Lastly, besides the
inequality channel emphasized in this dissertation, the saving rate of the highest-
income households appears to an important driver of the rise in the overall household
saving rate. To explain the saving behavior of these households with very high in-
comes, it would be interesting to introduce wealth-in-utility preferences into the
model. I plan to incorporate these elements in future research.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
I propose a mechanism linking top income inequality and the gains from trade,
through the effects of trade on aggregate saving. I calibrate the model to US data
and show that the supply-side channel of capital accumulation is quantitatively
relevant for the evaluation of the gains from trade.
I test the key predictions from the model using country-level data and find
strong support for the proposed mechanism. While the empirical results in the
third chapter suggest that the proposed mechanism is relevant for a typical country,
the mechanism is particularly interesting when we consider the recent experience
of China. China’s recent integration into the global economy coincided with a
rise in top income shares (Piketty and Qian, 2009) and a rise in the aggregate
saving rate (Yang, 2012). Using the 1992 liberalization episode in China, I find
that greater openness has positive and statistically significant effects on both the
household saving rate and the investment rate of a province.
In the theoretical model, to focus on the interaction between top income in-
equality and the gains from trade for the average worker, I have abstracted from
worker heterogeneity. Introducing worker heterogeneity would allow me to consider a
setting where workers differentially benefit from the increase in capital accumulation
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according to their skill levels. Lastly, as discussed earlier, allowing for international
capital flows would allow me to examine the distribution of the gains from trade
between countries. I leave these interesting topics for future research.
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Appendix 2A: Computational Algorithm for the Full Model
The computational algorithm used in this paper is an extension of the nested
fixed-point algorithm of Aiyagari (1994) and is similar to the algorithms used in
Buera and Shin (2013). The assumptions of differentiated goods and constant re-
turns to scale introduce a complication. Specifically, the total expenditure E on
differentiated goods enters the maximization problem of firms. For each economy,
I need to solve for equilibrium prices r and w, and aggregate expenditure E on
differentiated goods.
I set the price of the final good to be 1. To start, I discretize the asset space
a and the space for entrepreneur productivity z. I set the number of points in the
asset space to be 3001 and the number of points in the space for z to be 60.
1. Start with a guess of Lv which is the total variable labor input. The total







Since the final good producer makes zero profit, E is also the total expenditure
on the final good.
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2. Start with interest rate r and wage w. Calculate aggregate expenditure E
from r and w using Equation (2A.1).
3. For the set of prices r and w, and expenditure E, get the policy functions
a′(a, z), e(z) and c(a, z). This is carried out with a value function iteration
routine.
4. Guess the joint distribution of assets (a) and entrepreneur productivity (z) .
Use the policy functions from Step 2, and the transition matrix of z, to obtain
a new joint distribution the subsequent period. Continue the process until
the maximum difference between the joint distributions from two consecutive
periods is smaller than a given convergence criteria.
5. Check market clearing conditions for the labor market and capital rental mar-
ket. If markets do not clear at this point, update r and w with the bisection
method. Repeat Steps 2 to 4 until all markets clear.
6. Check that E = Y . If E 6= Y , update Lv and repeat Steps 1 to 5.
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Appendix 2B: Proof of Propositions
Proposition 1: Moving from Autarky (τ =∞) to any positive level of trade,
for any x ∈ (0, 100), the profit share of the top x% of entrepreneurs increases. This
holds true for any non-degenerate CDF function µ(z).










































The following algebraic properties are useful in the proofs.
























Proof of Proposition 1.
Define zx as µ(zx) = 1 − x100 . In Autarky, the profit share of the top x% of












where πD(.) is defined earlier. Constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) production and the






. The profit from exporting activities
for a firm with productivity z is given by τ 1−σπD(z)−w · fX . Recall that z̄X is the
productivity cutoff for exporting.
Case 1: zx > z̄X .









































where πDT (.) is the domestic profit function. Since exporters export only if export




















































































zσ−1µ(dx) + τ 1−σπDT (zmin)
∫∞
zx







zσ−1µ(dx) + τ 1−σπDT (zmin)
∫∞
z̄X














where πDA (.) is the profit function of a firm in Autarky. The left-hand side of the
above equation gives the share of total profit received by the top x% of firms in
Trade, while the right-hand side gives the corresponding share in Autarky.
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Case 2: zx ≤ z̄X .
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zσ−1µ(dx) + τ 1−σπDT (zmin)
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The left-hand side of the above equation gives the share of total profit received
by the top x% of firms in Trade, while the right-hand side of the above equation
gives the corresponding share in Autarky.
Proposition 2: Consider the special case of the model in which there is no capital
depreciation (δ = 0). Moving from Autarky (τ = ∞) to any positive level of
trade (τ < ∞, e(z) = 1 for some z), the share of total income received by workers
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increases.
Proof: The total wage bill in the economy is w while the total cost of capital rental





with Cobb-Douglas production. Therefore, with δ = 0,
rk = RK = w · Lv · α1−α .
Denote the equilibrium wages in Autarky and under Trade as wA and wT . With








1−α , where the second inequality follows because Lv = 1 under
Autarky. Denoting the fraction of exporters under Trade as pctX, 0 < pctX < 1,
total entrepreneurial profit in Trade is given by σ
σ−1
wT ·LTv
1−α − pctX · wT · fX , L
T
v < 1.









= (1− α) σ − 1
2σ − 1
(2B.1)
Analogously under Trade, the share of total income received by workers is given by
wT





















(1− α) σ − 1
2σ − 1
(2B.4)
The value in Equation (2B.4) is lower than that in Equation (2B.1) by inspection.
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Appendix 2C: Decomposition Exercises
2C.1 Decomposition of Change in the Aggregate Saving Rate
Proposition: In a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate saving rate of entrepreneurs
is zero.
Proof: From the budget constraint of an entrepreneur, we have
c(a, z) + a′(a, z) = max{πD(z), πX(z)}+ (1 + r)a.

















Denoting the aggregate quantities with C,K ′,Π and K, respectively, we have
C +K ′ = Π +K + rK.
In a stationary equilibrium, we have K = K ′. Therefore, we have C = Π + rK.
The left hand side is consumption while the right hand side is total income, which
consists of total profit income and total interest income. The aggregate saving rate
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of entrepreneurs is given by SRs =
Π+rK−C
Π+rK
= 0, {s=A, T}. Therefore, when we
compare the stationary equilibria under Autarky and under Trade, the aggregate
saving rate by entrepreneurs is necessarily the same at 0.1
Let the average saving rate of entrepreneurs with productivity z be srs(z) =
ys(z)−cs(z)
ys(z)







shareys(z)µ(dz) where ys(z) is the average income of all entrepreneurs with produc-
tivity z,2 and sharey(z) = ys(z)∫
ys(z)µ(dz)
. Following Olley and Pakes (1996),
























The first term in Equation (2C.1) is the “between” change in the saving rate,
which is the change in the saving rate if we hold the average saving rate of all
entrepreneurs of a given z fixed at its level under Autarky, but change the income
shares to their levels under Trade. The second term is the “within” change in the
saving rate, which is the change in the saving rate if we fix the income share of all
1Moving from Autarky to Trade, the gross saving rate of the economy increases. The aggregate
capital stock in the economy is K. In each period, δK amount of capital is depreciated, and the
same amount must be saved to maintain the capital stock at K. Therefore, the gross saving rate
of the economy in steady state is given by δKY . Since K increases more proportionally than Y from
Autarky to Trade in the calibration exercise, the gross saving rate δKY is higher under Trade than
under Autarky. It is helpful to note that the replacement of depreciated capital is carried out by
financial intermediaries instead of by entrepreneurs in the model, and entrepreneurs earn the net
return of saving r (instead of “R = r + δ”).
2The average is taken over entrepreneurs with different a. I am grouping the entrepreneurs
by z instead of by (a, z) because the joint distribution of (a, z) is an endogenous object. It is
not possible to match the entrepreneurs by (a, z) between the equilibria under Autarky and under
Trade.
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entrepreneurs at a given z at its level under Autarky, but change the saving rates
to their levels under Trade. In the baseline calibration of the full model, I find
the “between” change to be 1.72 percentage points and the “within” change to be
-1.83 percentage points. The last term is a co-variance term relating changes in
income shares to changes in the individual saving rate. The covariance term is 0.11
percentage point in the current application.
2C.2 Decomposition of Change in the Target-Wealth-to-Profit Ratio
Recall that a′s(a, z),s = {A, T} is the asset policy function of an entrepreneur
with asset a and productivity z, where the subscript s is added to emphasize that the
policy function is dependent on the trade regime, and A and T denote “Autarky”




s(z), z) = a
∗
s(z). The
target wealth a∗s(z) of an entrepreneur is the steady state asset holding if the en-
trepreneur were to receive the same z forever.3 Let the profit of an entrepreneur with










, s = {A, T} be the aggregate target-wealth-profit ratio. In
3CRRA utility guarantees that a∗s(z) is bounded for all z (Krueger, 2012). Numerically, a
∗
s(z) is
obtained by starting at a = 0 and iterating on the asset policy function a′s(a, z) until a
′
s(a, z) = a.
4The actual wealth-to-profit ratio at a given z is not a good measure of incentive to save
for entrepreneurs. For example, if an entrepreneur receives a low productivity draw after a long
series of high productivity draws, the wealth-to-profit ratio would be very high, even though this
entrepreneur would be actively dis-saving at the low z state. The ratio between aggregate target
wealth and actual aggregate wealth is 1.09 and 1.08 under Autarky and Trade, respectively.




s = {A, T}, where ys(z) is the average total income of entrepreneurs with productivity z. This
alternative approach produces similar results. I present the results based on πs(z) because some
interest income in ys(z) is derived from wealth accumulated under different values of z.
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The first term Equation (2C.3) is the “between” change, which is the change in M
if we fix ms(z) at its level under Autarky but change the profit shares to their levels
under Trade. The second term is the “within” change, which is the change in M
if we keep the profit shares at their levels under Autarky, but change ms(z) to its
level under Trade. The last term is a co-variance term relating changes in profit
shares to changes in the target-wealth-to-profit ratio. In my baseline calibration,
the “between” component, the “within” component and the covariance term account
for 152%, -46% and 6% of the change in the aggregate target-wealth-to-profit ratio
between Autarky and Trade, respectively.
138
Appendix 3A: Data Sources
Table 3A.1: Data Sources for the Empirical Exercises in Chapter 3
Variables Sources
Gross National Saving Rate WDI
Gross Investment Rate WDI
(“Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as % of GDP”)
GDP per capita WDI
Population WDI





Capital Account Openness Quinn and Toyoda (2008)
Labor Share of Income Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
Private Saving Rate Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000)
Top 10% Income Share UNU-WIDER (2014)
Institutional Quality Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999)
(As adapted by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004).)
Trade/GDP (PPP) PWT (Mark 8.0.)
(Sum of PPP export and PPP import over PPP GDP)
European Languages Hall and Jones (1999); IV for institutional quality
(Population share speaking one of five European Languages at birth)
Bilateral Trade Flows Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)
Geography Variables CEPII
(Used in estimating the gravity equation)
139
Appendix 3B: Robustness of Panel Regressions with IV
Table 3B.1: Robustness of Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions with IV: Alternative
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
K-Open Current-Y Growth D-graph Inflation Balance Gov-Size
Panel A: Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.278*** 0.222* 0.216** 0.224** 0.234** 0.103 0.175**
(0.0788) (0.123) (0.0922) (0.0939) (0.0952) (0.110) (0.0883)
Panel B: Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP -0.0209 -0.0923 -0.0510 -0.0525 -0.0434 0.0607 -0.0338
(0.0641) (0.0915) (0.0634) (0.0668) (0.0658) (0.0716) (0.0629)
N Countries 68 83 83 83 83 83 83
N Observations 372 441 440 441 440 441 439
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. I group the years 1961-2000 into eight five-year intervals and use the
averages of yearly data in the regressions. Time and country fixed effects are included in all regressions. The instrument
is the predicted trade share from a panel gravity regression (see text). The standard set of control variables include
log income and its square (both lagged), the Credit/GDP ratio (lagged) and log population. Column (1) controls
for capital account openness; Column (2) replaces the lagged income terms with current income terms; Column (3)
controls for the GDP growth rate; Column (4) controls for old and young dependency ratios; Column (5) controls for
the inflation rate; Column (6) controls for the trade balance; Column (7) controls for total government expenditure as
a share of GDP.
140
Table 3B.2: Robustness of Fixed-Effects Regressions with IV
Exclusion of Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subsample None E. Asia Europe & L. America M. East N. America S. Asia S.S. Africa
Excluded & Pacific C. Asia & Caribbean & N. Africa
Panel A: Gross National Saving Rate
Trade/GDP 0.221** 0.179 0.305** 0.151 0.179** 0.246** 0.207** 0.313***
(0.0952) (0.296) (0.129) (0.0966) (0.0840) (0.0988) (0.0953) (0.0846)
Panel B: Gross Investment Rate
Trade/GDP -0.0479 -0.199 -0.0226 -0.0847 -0.0134 -0.0167 -0.0566 -0.0381
(0.0679) (0.207) (0.0821) (0.0707) (0.0593) (0.0599) (0.0692) (0.0588)
N Countries 83 73 65 67 75 81 78 59
N Observations 441 387 337 355 401 427 414 325
Column (1) reproduces Column (2) of Table 3.9. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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